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This Article reports on four federal jury challenges in which the trial judge or 
defendants retained the author to provide research on jury selection plans. The 
research shows a persistent and substantial loss of representation for African 
Americans and Hispanics on federal juries, even though no intentional 
discrimination took place. Problems with undeliverable jury summonses, as well as 
failure to respond to summonses, were the main causes of departures from the ideal 
of cross-sectional jury selection. However, a cramped understanding of what it 
takes for a defendant to prove that minority jurors were systematically excluded, as 
required by Duren v. Missouri, kept three of the four judges in our challenges 
from responding to the problems. This Article argues for a legal change in the 
Duren test so as to enable federal courts to construct representative jury wheels.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION.................................................................................... 2
I. OVERVIEW OF STUDY ............................................................... 8
II. FOUR JURY CHALLENGES—SUMMARY RESULTS AND 
IMPACT .................................................................................. 11
III. EASTERN DIVISION OF THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS ... 12
IV. SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA ................................... 15
V. NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS ........................................ 25
VI. MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA, ORLANDO DIVISION ............ 29
VII. REMEDIES FOR SOURCE LIST PROBLEMS:
SUPPLEMENTING THE VOTER REGISTRATION LIST................ 32
A. African American Representation .................................... 34
B. Hispanic Representation ................................................ 35
VIII. REMEDIES FOR LOSS OF REPRESENTATION DUE TO 
UNDELIVERABLE MAIL/NON-RESPONSE ............................... 37
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................... 46
Professor of Law and Fellow of the Frank C. Erwin, Jr. Centennial Chair in Gov-
ernment, University of Texas at Austin. The author wishes to thank Kyle Chen, Haley Far-
rell, Emily Baxter, B. Graves Lee, Ross MacPherson, and students in my jury seminar at the 
University of Texas School of Law. Special thanks to Mary R. Rose, my frequent collaborator 
on jury challenges.
1
2 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 52:1
INTRODUCTION
Like Narcissus gazing at his own reflection,1 members of a local 
community draw comfort from seeing people like themselves in 
the jury pool. However, like Sisyphus,2 judges’ best efforts to em-
panel representative juries seem bound to fail.3 Practical difficulties 
abound: Some jurisdictions exclude residents who are not regis-
tered to vote;4 people move and do not receive their jury sum-
mons;5 prospective candidates frequently either ignore the sum-
mons when they do receive them6 or fail to appear on their 
assigned date;7 fines or other threats of punishment are too infre-
quent to have an effect;8 hardship excuses must be granted;9 lack 
of English proficiency disqualifies some potential jurors;10 the pay 
1. ROBERT GRAVES, THE GREEK MYTHS 275 (2012).
2. Id. at 201.
3. See United States v. Bates, No. 05-81027, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117073, at *45 (E.D. 
Mich. Dec. 15, 2009) (“[F]ederal districts have tackled the . . . dilemma [of underrepresen-
tation], with minimal success.”).
4. Three of the four federal jurisdictions studied in this Article (the Southern District 
of California, the Middle District of Florida, and the Northern District of Illinois) restricted
jury duty to registered voters when we brought the jury challenges, discussed infra Parts III–
VI. Currently, the Northern District of Illinois also draws juror names from the driver’s li-
cense list, the records of state-issued photo identification cards, and the list of unemploy-
ment applicants and recipients. See infra Part V. Overall, two-thirds of federal courts take 
juror names only from the list of registered voters. Thirty-nine districts supplement the voter 
registration list with the driver’s license list, the list of state-issued identification card hold-
ers, or some other source list. See Primary Source Lists Employed in Federal Courts (as of 
March 20, 2018) (tables compiled by the Federal Defender’s Office, M.D. Fla., Orl. Div.) (on 
file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). For a fifty-state survey of juror 
source lists, see Alexander E. Preller, Jury Duty is a Poll Tax: The Case for Severing the Link Be-
tween Voter Registration and Jury Service, 46 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1 app. (2012).
5. To give one example here from our jury challenge in the Middle District of Flori-
da’s Orlando Division, see infra notes 165–69 and accompanying text, the jury clerk mailed 
out 51,306 qualification questionnaires in 2009. Five thousand nine hundred ninety-six (or 
11.7%) were returned as undeliverable.
6. See infra Part VIII for an extended discussion of non-response to jury question-
naires or summonses.
7. See HON. GREGORY E. MIZE ET AL., THE STATE-OF-THE-STATES SURVEY OF JURY 
IMPROVEMENT EFFORTS: A COMPENDIUM REPORT 24 (2007) (citing to many courts that report 
failure to appear (FTA) rates of 15% or higher).
8. Id. at 25; see also, Telephone Interview with Thomas G. Bruton, Clerk of Court for 
the Northern Dist. of Ill. (Mar. 30, 2018) (sharing his impression that FTA remains a major 
problem in the district).
9. Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 224 (1946) (“[A] federal judge would 
be justified in excusing a daily wage earner for whom jury service would entail an undue fi-
nancial hardship.”); see also Reynolds v. McDonald, No. SACV 14-1972-JAK (JEM), 2017 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 142349, at *52 (C.D. Cal. June 1, 2017) (citing with approval to a line of cases 
approving “hardship policy of excusing potential jurors who had to travel more than an
hour and a half by public transportation” or for whom serving on a long trial would be a 
financial hardship).
10. Jasmine B. Gonzales Rose, Language Disenfranchisement on Juries: A Call for Constitu-
tional Remediation, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 811, 814 (2014) (indicating that some thirteen million 
citizens, mostly Hispanic, lose their right to serve on juries due to language restrictions). But 
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is lousy;11 people’s work and child care schedules need to be ac-
commodated;12 ex-felons are typically disqualified;13 non-citizen 
lawful residents are excluded;14 challenges for cause must be grant-
ed; and peremptory challenges are strategically deployed to elimi-
nate otherwise qualified jurors.15
These factors, singly and in combination, create juries that are 
not reflective of the community. Low-income and minority resi-
dents move more often,16 making it less likely that they receive 
their jury summons. Even if they do receive their summons, less 
wealthy individuals are less likely to respond.17 For instance, “Afri-
can[]Americans from economically poor zip codes had a substan-
tially lower response rate (60%) to [a jury summons] than whites 
from relatively wealthy zip codes (92%).”18 Moreover, poor and 
c.f. N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 3 (stating that the right to serve on a jury cannot be restricted 
based on language ability).
11. Federal jury service currently pays $40.00 per day, 28 U.S.C. § 1871 (2012), and may 
be increased to $50.00 after ten days. Jury Pay, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/
services-forms/jury-service/juror-pay (last visited Aug. 28, 2018). The average state pay is 
about $22.00 per day, increasing to $32.00 per day for longer trials. MIZE ET AL., supra note 
7, at 23. Only New Mexico, fully, and Oregon partly, mandate a minimum wage for jurors. 
See Evan R. Seamone, A Refreshing Jury Cola: Fulfilling the Duty to Compensate Jurors Adequately, 5 
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 289, 299, 352 (2002). For a state by state breakdown, see Jury 
Management, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., https://www.ncsc.org/topics/jury/jury-
management/state-links.aspx?cat=Juror%20Pay (last visited Aug. 28, 2018).
12. United States v. Bates, No. 05-81027, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117073, at *34 (E.D. 
Mich. Dec. 15, 2009) (approving “a policy of excusing individuals with transportation or 
child-care issues, or who could not take time from work,” and citing to Duren v. Missouri, 439 
U.S. 357, 370 (1979)).
13. Brian C. Kalt, Exclusion of Felons from Jury Service, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 65, 67 (2003); see
also State v. Christian, No. 61114-3-I, 2009 Wash. App. LEXIS 1709, at *9 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2009) (“[T]he exclusion of felons and accused felons from jury service has been upheld as 
constitutional.”).
14. Arguably, no constitutional provision prohibits states or the federal government 
from making lawfully resident non-citizens eligible to serve on juries. However, citizenship is 
a qualification by statute in every state and for the federal judiciary. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §
1865(b)(1) (2012). In the 2013–2014 legislative session, the California Assembly passed As-
sembly Bill AB-1401 making non-citizens eligible for jury duty. However, Governor Jerry 
Brown vetoed the bill. Eyder Peralta, Calif. Gov. Jerry Brown Vetoes Bill Giving Non Citizens Jury 
Duty, NPR (Oct. 7, 2013, 7:49 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2013/
10/07/230242924/calif-gov-brown-vetoes-bill-giving-non-citizens-jury-duty.
15. See JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF
DEMOCRACY 131–39 (2000).
16. Paula Hannaford-Agor, Systematic Negligence in Jury Operations: Why the Definition of 
Systematic Exclusion in Fair Cross Section Claims Must Be Expanded, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 761, 773 
(2011) (“Local migration rates are highly correlated with socioeconomic status, which in 
turn is correlated with minority status. Individuals with lower socioeconomic statuses tend to 
change their place of residence more frequently . . . .”).
17. According to a Dallas County survey of persons who failed to appear for jury duty 
when summoned, 51.2% of the Hispanic respondents, 45.1% of the African-American re-
spondents, but only 15.2% of white respondents had an annual household income of less 
than $35,000. Ted M. Eades, Revisiting the Jury System in Texas: A Study of the Jury Pool in Dallas 
County, 54 SMU L. REV. 1813, 1816 n.18 (2001).
18. United States v. Murphy, No. 94 CR 794, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8488, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 
June 17, 1996).
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minority residents are less likely to be registered voters,19 citizens,20
or proficient in English.21 The practice of jury selection rarely 
reaches the ideal of randomly recruiting jurors from a representa-
tive cross-section of the population.
The difficulties are not merely practical. The ideal of “mirror”
image representation22 is itself contested when applied to the jury. 
As one commentator notes, “we have two conflicting aims here. 
One is to get intelligent and informed jurors and the other is the 
desire for a community cross-section. They are not [in the opinion 
of this commentator] altogether reconcilable. . . .”23
For instance, restricting jury duty to registered voters, as many
federal districts do, will leave out those who have not registered to 
vote. Some regard this as a good thing, since it “automatically elim-
inates those individuals not interested enough in their government 
to vote or indeed not qualified to do so.”24 These critics question 
why anyone would want to include persons who did not bother to 
exercise their voting rights in our jury pools.25 They would prefer 
to exclude the civically indifferent among us.26
The quizzical aspect of jury representation is that the ideal re-
quires more than merely not discriminating in selecting jurors one 
19. According to the United States Census Bureau, in the last presidential election in
2016, 70.3% of the 18+ citizen population registered to vote. However, if we break the total 
down according to groups, the registration rates were 73.9% for non-Hispanic whites; 69.4% 
for African Americans; and 57.3% of Hispanics. U.S. CENSUS, VOTING AND REGISTRATION IN 
THE ELECTION OF NOVEMBER, 2016 tbl.4b (2017). All of the above figures are percentages of 
the group’s 18+ citizen population.
20. See discussion infra Parts IV–VI for the effects of controlling for citizenship on His-
panic representation but not African-American representation.
21. See Gonzales Rose, supra note 10, at 814 (“Under a conservative estimate, 11.3 mil-
lion of the 13 million non-English proficient U.S. citizens are people of color, and the vast 
majority are Latino.”).
22. HANNA PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 60–61 (1967). Mirror image rep-
resentation is when deputies stand in for the community, since descriptively they look like 
the community. Id.
23. Rose Jade, Voter Registration Status as a Jury Service Employment Test: Oregon’s Retracted 
Endorsement Following Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc., 39 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 557, 699 n.418 (2003) (quoting Eastman Birkett, Esq., Chairman of the 
Committee on Federal Legislation of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, tes-
tifying before Congress on the JSSA).
24. ABRAMSON, supra note 15, at 129 (quoting the chair of the committee of federal 
judges who drafted an earlier version of the JSSA).
25. See United States v. Gometz, 730 F.2d 475, 479 (7th Cir. 1984) (“Voter lists contain 
an important built-in screening element in that they eliminate those individuals who are 
either unqualified to vote or insufficiently interested in the world about them to do 
so . . . .”) (quoting S. REP. No. 90-891, at 22 (1967)). However, a 2008 Census Bureau survey 
found that only one-third of eligible Hispanics who had not registered to vote gave as their 
reason lack of interest. Among the other two-thirds, the most common reasons for not regis-
tering were missing the deadline or not knowing where or how to register. THOM FILE &
SARAH CRESLEY, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: VOTING AND REGISTRATION IN THE 
ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 2008 at 14 tbl.6 (2008).
26. Gometz, 730 F.2d at 479.
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by one.27 Intentional discrimination during jury selection rightfully 
makes democratic blood boil and spurs judges to act.28 Reform in 
this area was a critical step toward creating a representative jury. 
But what if, as appears to be the case, the government does not in-
tend to exclude anyone from jury duty by race or ethnicity,29 and 
yet the results are still unrepresentative jury venires? Discrepancies 
between equality of opportunity and equality of result are familiar 
in American law.30 In jury selection, that discrepancy is especially 
important.31 It is one thing to fulfill the negative right housed in 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ prohibition of discrimina-
tion. It is a further (and good) thing to fulfill the positive or af-
firmative right housed in the Sixth Amendment’s requirement that 
only a representative jury system can deliver impartial justice.32
27. See Nina W. Chernoff, Wrong About the Right: How Courts Undermine the Fair Cross-
Section Guarantee by Confusing It with Equal Protection, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 141, 143–44 (2012) 
(“The fair cross-section standard reflects the Court’s recognition that—separate and inde-
pendent from the harm of discrimination—absence of any distinctive group in the commu-
nity ‘deprives the jury of a perspective on human events’ . . . .”).
28. The very first case in which the Supreme Court interpreted the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment involved de jure discrimination against the right of 
African Americans to serve on juries. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305 (1880). 
In Batson v. Kentucky, the Court relied on principles of intentional discrimination, not ideals 
of representation, to prevent prosecutors from deliberately striking a qualified juror on ac-
count of race. 476 U.S. 79, 91 (1986).
29. See, e.g., Gometz, 730 F.2d at 481 (distinguishing cases of intentional discrimination 
against prospective African-American jurors, where judges have “not merely the power but 
the duty” to act, from tolerable cases where African Americans have been underrepresented 
without discrimination).
30. Compare Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (holding that under Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a complainant does not have to prove discriminatory in-
tent where the results of an employment test unrelated to job performance have a disparate 
impact on minority employment) with Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding 
that when job applicant suing under the Fourteenth Amendment, which requires only that 
employment test give minority applicants equality of opportunity and not equality of re-
sults).
31. As the trial judge correctly understood in our jury challenge brought in the Eastern 
Division of the District of Massachusetts, “[t]he distinction is important. An Equal Protec-
tion challenge concerns the process of selecting jurors, or the allegation that selection deci-
sions were made with discriminatory intent. The Sixth Amendment, on the other hand, is 
concerned with impact . . . .” United States v. Green, 389 F. Supp. 2d 29, 51 (D. Mass. 2005)
(emphasis in original), overruled on other grounds by In re United States, 426 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 
2005). Sometimes there is even a tension between the ideals, as when a court relied on equal 
protection principles to prohibit race conscious methods of achieving cross-sectional repre-
sentation. See, e.g., United States v. Ovalle, 136 F.3d 1092, 1095–96 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding 
that courts cannot correct for underrepresentation of African Americans in the jury pool by 
removing the names of qualified white jurors).
32. See People v. Morales, 770 P.2d 244, 276 (Cal. 1989) (Broussard, J., dissenting) 
(“The Fourteenth Amendment protects against intentional discrimination in the selection 
of venires, but the Sixth Amendment protects against unintentional deviations from the 
constitutional standard.”); see also Jade, supra note 23, at 665 (quoting United States v. 
Armsbury, 408 F. Supp. 1130, 1139–40 (D. Or. 1976) (“A defendant is not required by the 
Constitution to show bad faith discrimination in voter registration or jury selection in order 
to prevail . . . . The very philosophy and purpose of the Sixth Amendment requires . . . focus 
on the issue of a fair cross section and not on the issue of discrimination.”)).
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The structure of the Jury Selection and Service Act (JSSA) re-
flects congressional awareness of the difference between prevent-
ing discrimination, on one hand, and ensuring representative ju-
ries, on the other. In one section, Congress outlawed 
discrimination.33 In another, it required grand and petit juries to 
be “selected at random from a fair cross section of the community 
in the district or division wherein the court convenes.”34 In a third, 
it approved drawing juror names from the voter registration list, on 
the assumption that every citizen of voting age had an equal op-
portunity to register.35 And in a fourth section, Congress qualified 
the use of the list—mandating that districts supplement the voter 
registration list when it fails to approximate a fair cross-section of 
the community.36
Despite clear language in the JSSA mandating supplementation 
of the voter registration list when necessary to achieve fair repre-
sentation for all eligible citizens, federal judges are loathe to fault 
exclusive reliance on the voter registration list as a source of juror 
names.37 Courts tolerate approximations to the cross-sectional ideal 
to an extent that they would never tolerate falling short of the anti-
discrimination ideal.38 Reported decisions are full of instances 
where the trial judge accepted the accuracy of data showing un-
derrepresentation of minorities and yet found the loss of fair rep-
33. 28 U.S.C. § 1862 (2012) (“No citizen shall be excluded from service as a grand or 
petit juror in the district courts of the United States . . . on account of race, color, religion, 
sex, national origin, or economic status.”).
34. 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012).
35. 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2) (2012).
36. Id. (“The plan shall prescribe some other source or sources of names in addition to 
voter lists where necessary to foster the policy and protect the rights secured by . . . this ti-
tle.”). According to the House report, the JSSA mandated that “any substantial percentage 
deviations must be corrected by the use of supplemental sources.” H.R. REP. NO. 95-1076, at 
3 (1978), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1792, 1794, 1968 WL 4922
37. See United States v. Oldham, No. 12-20287, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57093, at *11 
(E.D. Mich. Apr. 24, 2014) (“[T]he circuit courts are in complete agreement that neither 
the [JSSA] nor the Constitution require that a supplemental source of names be added to 
voter lists simply because an identifiable group votes in a proportion lower than the rest of 
the population.”).
38. United States v. Orange, 447 F.3d 792, 798 (10th Cir. 2006) (“In order to war-
rant judicial intervention, the disparities must be ‘gross’ or ‘marked.’”). As described in Part 
IV, we constantly kept bumping up against the so-called “ten percent rule,” where courts 
gave safe harbor to any jury plan that fell short of fairly representing a given group by 10%
or less. In rejecting our challenge in the Southern District of California, the trial judge re-
marked that “the fact that representation of minority groups can be improved does not 
mean that the current selection procedures are in violation of the Constitution or the JSSA.”
United States v. Hernandez-Estrada, No. 10cr0558 BTM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32157, at *9 
(S.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2011), aff’d, 704 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2012), aff’d en banc, 749 F.3d 1154 
(9th Cir. 2014); see also United States v. Lewis, 472 F.2d 252, 255 (3d. Cir. 1973) (holding 
that even if supplementing the voter registration list with some other source lists would lead 
to a fairer representation of the community, the Constitution requires only a “fair” cross sec-
tion).
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resentation to be legally insignificant.39 Far fewer are cases where 
the cross-sectional principle receives rigorous judicial enforce-
ment. Although several federal district judges have been con-
cerned enough about the underrepresentation of minorities to 
suggest amending their jury plans,40 only a handful of districts have 
actually done so.41
In the groundbreaking 1975 case, Taylor v. Louisiana, the Su-
preme Court applied the cross-sectional requirement to state juries 
as a matter of constitutional law for the first time.42 The Court con-
troversially reasoned that only a representative pool in a diverse so-
ciety could truly be said to be impartial.43 But even as it announced 
this sweeping new interpretation of the Sixth Amendment’s guar-
antee of a trial before an impartial jury, the Court began to cabin 
its interpretation in ways that still roil the waters. Taylor insisted 
that jury selection must start from a representative list, but it just as 
strongly insisted that defendants had no right to any level of repre-
sentation in their particular juries.44
39. Sanjay K. Chhablani, Re-Framing the ‘Fair Cross-Section’ Requirement, 13 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 931, 948 (2011) (“[D]efendants have had little success in federal courts raising 
Sixth Amendment claims . . . .”).
40. See, e.g., United States v. Bates, No. 05-81027, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117073, at *44–
45 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 15, 2009) (“The Court could end its analysis here simply by reaffirming 
the constitutionality of the . . . Jury Selection Plan. However, to do so would be an admission 
of incapability, or worse, unwillingness to, address factors that contribute to the underrepre-
sentation of African Americans, . . . even though those factors . . . do not rise to the level of a 
constitutional violation.”). For cases in a similar vein, see Chernoff, supra note 27, at 146 
n.22.
41. Even though defendants lost their jury challenges in the Eastern Division of the 
District of Massachusetts and the Northern District of Illinois, see discussion infra Parts III 
and V, these two districts subsequently chose to amend their jury plans as a matter of policy. 
UNITED STATES DIST. COURT FOR THE DIST. OF MASS., PLAN FOR RANDOM SELECTION OF 
JURORS § 8 (Nov. 1, 2015) [hereinafter DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS PLAN], 
http://www.mad.uscourts.gov/resources/pdf/RevisedJuryPlan.pdf; UNITED STATES DIST.
COURT FOR THE N. DIST. OF ILL., PLAN FOR RANDOM SELECTION OF JURORS (Jan. 26, 2017) 
[hereinafter NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS PLAN], http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/_assets/
_documents/_forms/_press/ILNDJuryPlan.pdf. The District of Kansas has also amended its 
jury plan in ways similar to the Northern District of Illinois reforms. See D. KAN. R. PRACTICE 
AND P. 38.1(g)(2) (2016), http://www.ksd.uscourts.gov/wp-content/uploads/local_rules/
local_rules.pdf.
42. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975).
43. See id. at 530–31; see also Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503–04 (1972) (Marshall, J.) 
(discussing risk of actual bias as well as appearance of bias in unrepresentative juries). Social 
science research also supports the conclusion that racially mixed juries adjudicate cases 
against non-white defendants and victims differently and more accurately than do all-white 
tribunals. See Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, How Much Do We Really Know About 
Race and Juries? A Review of Social Science Theory and Research, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 997, 1028 
(2003); see also Tanya E. Coke, Lady Justice May Be Blind, But Is She a Soul Sister?, 69 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 327, 357 (1994) (“[I]mpartiality is not embodied in a single ‘ideal’ juror but achieved 
through the cross-pollination of a range of views and experiences.”).
44. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538 (“[W]e impose no requirement that petit juries actually cho-
sen must mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive groups in the population. 
Defendants are not entitled to a jury of any particular composition . . . .”).
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These two principles of law are in tension. The Court lauded the 
importance of representation to deliberation and dialogue. And 
yet the only place where deliberation actually occurs (the petit ju-
ry) is precisely the place where the ideal of representation has no 
black letter law application. This limit on the reach of the cross-
sectional principle reveals a hedged bet on the ideal. We preach 
the importance of representation without practicing it.45 Mostly, 
courts rehearse the practical difficulties that make the cross-
sectional standard hard to achieve46 and note that twelve-person ju-
ries do not have enough seats to accommodate representatives 
from all competing community groups.47
Beyond the practical difficulties, there is discomfort with the 
norm.48 The closer courts get to putting real persons on an actual 
jury, the more they sharply separate the overriding ideal of impar-
tiality from the ideal of community representation. Instead of re-
forming jury selection to practice what we preach about the im-
portance of representation, we repeat the same tired excuses for 
why we cannot do better.
I. OVERVIEW OF STUDY
In this Article, I draw on my work as a court-appointed or de-
fense-retained jury selection expert in four different federal cases.49
45. See Mary R. Rose et al., Jury Pool Underrepresentation in the Modern Era: Evidence from 
Federal Courts, 15 J. EMP. L. STUD. 1, 13 (2018) (noting that minority “underrepresentation is 
ubiquitous”).
46. United States v. Cecil, 836 F.2d 1431, 1455 (4th Cir. 1988) (noting problems of de-
lay and administrative burdens in overly enforcing the cross-sectional requirement).
47. Kenneth Conboy, The Race Factor and Trial by Jury, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 551, 555 
(1993) (“[A]ny attempt to even facially approximate the racial (and gender, national origin 
and sexual preference) composition of a community in its jury boxes must ultimately fail in 
a society as diverse and mobile as ours.”).
48. See, e.g., Andrew D. Leipold, Constitutionalizing Jury Selection in Criminal Cases: A Criti-
cal Evaluation, 86 GEO. L.J. 945, 964 (1998) (“Although the cross-section doctrine is prem-
ised on the notion that different races and genders often view the world differently, Batson
has declared these differences legally irrelevant.”); see also Richard M. Re, Re-Justifying the Fair 
Cross Section Requirement: Equal Representation and Enfranchisement in the American Criminal Jury,
116 YALE L.J. 1568, 1602 (2007) (suggesting that Justice Kennedy has “tacitly endorsed [a] 
revisionist interpretation” that understands fair cross-section cases to be based on equal pro-
tection principles).
49. The four jurisdictions were the Eastern Division of the District of Massachusetts 
(court appointed, pursuant to FED. R. EVID. 706, United States v. Green, 389 F. Supp. 2d 29, 
39 (D. Mass. 2005), mandamus granted, In re United States, 426 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005)); the 
Southern District of California (defense expert, United States v. Garcia-Arellano, Case. No. 
08cr-2876 BTM (S.D. Cal. June 9, 2009); defense expert, United States v. Hernandez-
Estrada, No. 10cr0558 BTM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32157 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2011), aff’d.,
704 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2012), aff’d. en banc, 749 F. 3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2014)); the Northern 
District of Illinois (defense expert in United States v. Ivy, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9347 (N.D. 
Ill. Feb. 1, 2011) (transcript of hearing on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law 
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Defendants in each case challenged their jury pool as depriving 
them of their constitutional and statutory rights to select a jury 
from a fair cross-section of the community.50 By studying the results 
of these challenges, I hope to shed light on some of the overarch-
ing issues of representation noted in the previous section.
Typically, litigants and researchers train their sights on the ini-
tial and final stages of jury selection, studying the representative-
ness of the source lists for filling the Master Jury Wheel51 and the 
extent to which peremptory challenges drain diversity from juries 
at the end.52 However, in each of the four challenges studied in this 
Article, the key obstacles to empaneling representative juries arose 
during the overlooked and understudied53 middle stages of jury se-
lection.54
These middle steps are the stages where courts mail out jury 
summonses or qualification questionnaires.55 Only a subset of those 
mailings are delivered to the correct addresses.56 That limited sub-
set shrinks further when there is no response from those who, pre-
sumably, did receive the summons or questionnaire.57
Reform)); and the Middle District of Florida, Orlando Division (United States v. Pritt, 2010 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63470 (M.D. Fla. June 8, 2010), aff’d., 458 Fed. App’x 795 (11th Cir. 2012).
50. For the constitutional requirement, see Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 527–28
(1975). For the statutory requirement, see 28 U.S.C. § 1863 (2012).
51. See, e.g., Pritt, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63470, at *9 (“[The defendant’s] primary ar-
gument is that use of the voter registration list alone . . . underrepresents Blacks and His-
panics . . . .”).
52. See J. Clark Kelso, Final Report of the Blue Ribbon Commission on Jury System Improvement,
47 HASTINGS L.J. 1433, 1474 (1996) (“The use[s] of peremptory challenges to sculpt a jury 
to be predisposed to one side or the other . . . are serious threats to the jury system.”); see
also David C. Baldus et al., Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder Trials, 3 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 3 (2001).
53. Kelso, supra note 52, at 1453 (“[T]he summons stage is . . . a component that is 
desperately in need of attention.”).
54. In 2011, a co-author and I published some lessons for empirical legal studies drawn
from these challenges. See Mary R. Rose & Jeffrey B. Abramson, Data, Race, and the Courts: 
Some Lessons on Empiricism from Jury Representation Cases, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 911 (2011).
That report did not include results from the Northern District of Illinois, and this Article 
focuses on legal reforms that the jury challenges in Illinois and Massachusetts helped to 
bring about.
55. Federal courts have the option of using a two-step or one-step jury selection process.
Jury Selection and Service Act (JSSA), 28 U.S.C. § 1878 (2012). In the two-step process, the 
court first mails out a qualification questionnaire, to randomly selected names on its master 
jury wheel, to determine eligibility to serve. See, e.g., Jury Service, U.S. DISTRICT CT.,
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEX., http://www.txnd.uscourts.gov/jury-service (last visited Aug. 
28, 2018). From the pool of qualified jurors, the court then summons people as needed. Id.
The one-step process summons and qualifies prospective jurors simultaneously. See MIZE ET 
AL., supra note 7, at 15–16. Half of the states leave the choice between procedures to the dis-
cretion of local courts. Id. All four of the federal jurisdictions studied in this Article used the 
two-step process, which is the default procedure recommended in federal law. 28 
U.S.C. § 1878 (2012).
56. See discussion infra Part VIII.
57. Id. In many multi-unit buildings without dedicated mail slots, the United States 
Postal Service (USPS) has discretion to leave mail at the door or other accessible areas. See
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In theory, jury selection is a draft.58 In practice, a large percent-
age of citizens opt out of the jury draft without consequence.59 By 
the time failed mailings,60 failure to respond to a questionnaire,61
and failure to appear when summoned62 take their toll on jury se-
lection, the remaining pool of available jurors is smaller and far 
less representative of key groups in the community than the ideal 
of cross-sectional selection demands.63
This Article uses the term “Available Jury Wheel” (AJW) to draw 
attention to these middle steps and away from the obscuring focus 
on the “Master Jury Wheel” (MJW). It does not matter if members 
of a cognizable group are fairly represented on the MJW but dis-
appear from the AJW and “Qualified Jury Wheel” (QJW)—the only 
wheels or pools from which actual jury venires are drawn.64
In each of the four federal districts studied here, jury selection 
moved through the following steps.65 First, the district specified an 
initial source list or lists from which it drew names of potential ju-
rors. Three of the four courts studied (California, Illinois, and 
Florida) relied exclusively on the voter registration list as a source 
of jurors.66 Second, each district created an MJW by randomly 
drawing enough names from the source list to meet the anticipat-
ed need for jurors. Third, jury qualification questionnaires went 
out through the mail to the names selected at random. Fourth, the 
post office returned some number of questionnaires as undeliver-
able. Fifth, persons responded or did not respond to the question-
naire. Sixth, the jury clerk created an AJW from those who re-
sponded. Seventh, the jury clerk created a QJW from the AJW,
USPS, POSTAL OPERATIONS MANUAL § 631 (April 5, 2012), https://about.usps.com/postal-
bulletin/2012/pb22334/html/updt_001.htm.
58. Andrew M. Pauwels, Mandatory National Service: Creating Generations of Civic Minded 
Citizens, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2597, 2605 (2013). Jury duty is a kind of lottery. In state 
courts, only 15% of American adults receive a summons each year, and less than 5% serve. 
Numbers are even smaller in federal courts. See John Gramlich, Jury Duty Is Rare, but Most 
Americans See it as Part of Good Citizenship, PEW RESEARCH CTR. FACTTANK (Aug. 24, 2017), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/08/24/jury-duty-is-rare-but-most-americans-
see-it-as-part-of-good-citizenship/.




63. See Kelso, supra note 52, at 1449 (“Low yields result in juries that are less representa-
tive of the community and cause the burdens of jury service to be concentrated among rela-
tively few citizens.”).
64. For use of the term “available jury wheel,” see United States v. Green, 389 F. Supp. 
2d 29, 40.
65. These steps are typical of the two-step process used in most federal courts. See Jury 
Selection and Service Act (JSSA), 28 U.S.C. § 1878 (2012).
66. For the unique source list used in the District of Massachusetts, see discussion infra 
Part III. See supra note 4 for data on use of the voter registration list as the only source of 
juror names in most federal courts. See also Preller, supra note 4, at app.
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after eliminating those whose questionnaire responses indicated 
that they were statutorily disqualified.
II. FOUR JURY CHALLENGES—SUMMARY RESULTS AND IMPACT
Trial judges rejected the challenges in three of the four cases 
studied in this Article.67 Only in Massachusetts did the trial judge, 
Judge Nancy J. Gertner, grant the defendant’s motion and propose 
remedies to recruit a more representative venire for the pending 
capital murder trial.68 However, even there, the United States
Court of Appeals promptly granted the government’s request for a 
writ of mandamus, effectively reversing Judge Gertner’s order for 
remedy.69
While the challenges had little impact on their respective cases,
the District of Massachusetts and the Northern District of Illinois 
subsequently amended their jury plans to address the problems 
that we had located.70 A trial judge in a third district, the Southern 
District of California, agreed with our data and recommended that 
the District consider amending its jury plan in the future.71 Moreo-
ver, although the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the denial 
of the defendant’s jury challenge in the Southern District of Cali-
fornia, the full court agreed to change the legal test for measuring 
the unrepresentativeness of a jury pool.72 Only in the Middle Dis-
trict of Florida, Orlando Division, did we make no progress.
The following Parts review each challenge separately. Taken to-
gether, the four challenges show a pattern. Each federal court’s
MJW fell short of representing a cross-section of the population. 
However, the starting “representation deficit” on the MJW was rela-
tively small when compared to the mounting loss of minority jurors 
on the AJW. These losses were due primarily to the disproportion-
ate impact that undeliverable qualification questionnaires and 
non-response to jury forms, presumably delivered, had on the re-
tention of minority jurors. The result was a dramatic loss of repre-
67. These were the challenges in the Southern District of California, the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois, and the Middle District of Florida.
68. United States v. Green, 389 F. Supp. 29 (D. Mass. 2005). For the remedies, see dis-
cussion infra Part VII.
69. In re United States, 426 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 2005).
70. DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS PLAN, supra note 41; NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 
PLAN, supra note 41.
71. United States v. Garcia-Arellano, Case. No. 08cr-2876 BTM, at *15 (S.D. Cal. June 9, 
2009) (“Defendant raises valid points regarding the shortcomings of the Southern District’s
present plan that should be given serious consideration.”)
72. I explain this change in the legal test for measuring jury underrepresentation in 
Part IV.
12 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 52:1
sentation on the AJW, much worse than the starting problems with 
the MJW. By contrast, the creation of a QJW from the AJW, while 
eliminating individuals, did not alter the proportional representa-
tion of cognizable groups.
III. EASTERN DIVISION OF THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
By state law, Massachusetts requires each of its cities and towns 
to conduct an annual census of its population.73 Taking note of 
these lists, Congress specifically amended the JSSA in 1992 to per-
mit Massachusetts to select juror names from these local lists.74 The 
hope was that the counts of local populations were accurate 
enough to provide a basis for cross-sectional jury selection.75
In United States v. Green, the defendant pointed out fundamental 
flaws in the local population counts.76 Despite a state mandate, not 
every city and town conducted an annual census; many lacked 
funding to do so (the state mandate was unfunded).77 This prob-
lem affected poorer cities more than wealthier ones, and larger cit-
ies more than smaller communities.78 The result was that the un-
dercounting of residents was at its worst in big cities with the 
highest concentration of African-American residents.79
In my independent research on behalf of the court, I confirmed 
these problems with constructing an MJW on the basis of the city 
and town census lists.80 However, I pointed out to the court that 
although problems existed with the MJW, they were dwarfed by the 
growing loss of representation on the AJW.81 Moreover, the prob-
lems with the AJW were not entirely attributable to the source list 
but also to problems with undeliverable mail82 and non-response 
from those who presumably received their questionnaires.83 While 
73. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 234A, § 10. (LexisNexis 2018).
74. Jury Selection and Service Act (JSSA), 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2) (2012); see also Unit-
ed States v. Green, 389 F. Supp. 2d 29, 42 (D. Mass. 2005).
75. See Green, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 36.
76. See id.
77. Id. at 43 n.25 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 234A, § 10 (LexisNexis 2018) (dictating 
that towns shall bear the costs of the count)).
78. Cf. id. at 49.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 35 n.1 (“[This Court’s decision] reflects comments made by the Court’s ex-
pert, Professor Jeffrey Abramson, on September 1, 2005.”); see also Jeffrey Abramson, Report 
on Defendants’ Challenge to the Racial Composition of Jury Pools in the Eastern Division of 
the United States District Court for the District of Mass. 25–29 (2005) [hereinafter “Abram-
son Report”] (on file with court and with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
81. Abramson Report, supra note 80, at 36–39.
82. Id. at 38–39.
83. Id. at 42–46.
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the Division’s overall undeliverable rate was 12.4%,84 ten zip codes 
in neighborhoods of Boston with high concentrations of African 
Americans exceeded 20%.85 Whereas the average non-response 
rate was 12.2% in the Division,86 the non-response rate in Boston, 
home to the vast majority of the Division’s African-American popu-
lation, was 23%.87
It proved possible to pinpoint the disproportionate impact that 
undeliverable mail and non-responses had on maintaining minori-
ty representation. Eighty percent of the Eastern Division’s African-
American population (18+) lived in fourteen towns, out of a total 
of 190 locales.88 Table 1 compares the difference in jury selection 
outcomes in those fourteen towns, with the outcomes in the twen-
ty-one towns with the fewest African-American residents.89
TABLE 1: COMPARISON OF JURY SUMMONSING IN TOWNS WITH LOW 
VS. HIGH NUMBER OF AFRICAN AMERICANS
Twenty-One








Percent Mailed 103.5 85.3
Number on MJW 10,348 8,530
Percent Undeliverable 5.8 18.4
Percent Not Returned 7.6 16.9
Percent Missing Forms 13.4 35.3
Total Prospective
Jurors on AJW 8,961 5,519
Percent comparison of retention in the 
“14” vs. the “21” set 61.6
As expected, problems with the source list meant that, for every 
10,000 persons that should have been present on the initial source 
84. United States v. Green, 389 F. Supp. 2d 29, 44 n.29 (D. Mass. 2005).
85. Abramson Report, supra note 80, at 40; see also Green, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 61 (citing 
high undeliverable rates to addresses in Suffolk County, whose population is mainly in Bos-
ton).
86. Green, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 61–62.
87. Abramson Report, supra note 80, at 42; Green, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 62.
88. Abramson Report, supra note 80, at 41–42; Green, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 49.
89. Abramson Report, supra note 80, at 31. This table is based on Defendant’s Table 33, 
appended to Fourth Declaration of Andrew A. Beveridge, defendant’s expert witness (on 
file in court and with author). See also Green, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 48 n.35.
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list, only 8,530, or 85.3% were counted in the lists for the fourteen 
cities and towns where most of the District’s African-American 
population lived. By contrast, the cities and towns with low num-
bers of African-American residents actually were overrepresented 
on the initial source list.90
The situation got even worse. Whereas the post office returned 
as undeliverable 5.8% of questionnaires mailed to addresses in the 
cities and towns with low numbers of African-American residents, it 
returned 18.4% in the subset of fourteen cities and towns with 
high numbers of African-American residents.91 Whereas 7.6% of 
the questionnaires mailed to the low-percentage African-American 
cities and towns received no response, the percentage rose to 
16.9% of questionnaires delivered in the fourteen cities and towns
with high-percentage African-American populations.92 Combining 
undeliverables with non-responses, 13.4% of prospective jurors 
that should have been on the AJW disappeared in the cities and 
towns with low numbers of American Americans, compared to the 
disappearance of 35.3% of potential jurors in the fourteen cities 
and towns set.93
The bottom line is that the total yield from mailing jury ques-
tionnaires to residents in the fourteen cities and towns with higher 
numbers of African American residents accounted for only 61.6% 
of the yield in the comparable set. For every 10,000 people in the 
fourteen-town set, only 5,519 remained available on the AJW. For 
every 10,000 people in the cities and towns with few African-
American residents, 8,961 made it onto the AJW.94
However, as compelling as these numbers were as evidence of 
African-American underrepresentation, reigning precedent left 
Judge Gertner, the trial judge presiding over the Green case, in a 
legal vacuum. Under those precedents, the defendants bore the 
burden of showing not only that African Americans were un-
derrepresented but also that they were being systematically exclud-
ed by the government’s jury plan.95 To the extent that rotten 
source lists compiled by the government were the genesis of un-
derrepresentation, this would meet the burden of showing system-
atic exclusion. But by shifting the blame from the source list to the 
problems of undeliverable mail and non-response, the court’s own 
jury expert (this author) created a quandary. No court ever count-
90. See supra Table 1.
91. See supra Table 1.
92. See supra Table 1.
93. See supra Table 1.
94. See supra Table 1.
95. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 373 (1979).
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ed problems of non-response or non-delivery as “defects” attribut-
able to the government’s system for finding jurors, as opposed to 
practical problems likely to occur in any jury plan.96 Although she 
would be overruled on other grounds,97 Judge Gertner became one 
of the first to fault a jury plan for underrepresentation caused by 
problems with assembling a representative group of actually availa-
ble prospective jurors.98
Knowing that the Equal Protection Clause prohibited her from 
ordering a race-conscious remedy, the trial judge mandated that, 
for every questionnaire returned as undeliverable from a given zip 
code, a replacement questionnaire be sent to a new address of a 
resident in the same zip code.99 The judge ordered the same rem-
edy for non-response. Given that these problems were worse in hy-
per-segregated neighborhoods, the hope was to achieve a more 
representative AJW.
Among our jury challenges, this was our only victory. It proved 
short-lived. The U.S. Attorney sought a writ of mandamus prohibit-
ing Judge Gertner from putting her remedies into effect, and the 
First Circuit Court of Appeals granted the writ, holding that a sin-
gle judge in a multi-judge district lacks authority to change the ex-
isting jury plan on her own.100
IV. SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
The large county of San Diego and the smaller county of Impe-
rial make up the Southern District of California. We worked with 
the Federal Defenders of San Diego (FD) in two jury challenges to 
the District’s jury wheels.101 Between 1999 and 2009, the District 
filled and emptied its MJW every two years. The court gave us ac-
cess to data from all six of these MJWs.
96. See, e.g., United States v. Bates, No. 05-81027, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117073, at *41 
(E.D. Mich. Dec. 15, 2009) (finding that undeliverable mail and non-response “are factors 
external to, and not inherent in, jury selection plans.”).
97. In re United States, 426 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2005). The appeals court ruled that a sin-
gle judge in a multi-member District lacked the authority to effectively amend the District’s
jury plan on her own, for the sake of one trial. Id.
98. Judge Gertner rested her decision on statutory, rather than constitutional, grounds 
and found that failure to supplement the flawed town lists with other, more accurate juror 
source lists constituted a “substantial failure to comply” with the JSSA, 28 U.S.C. §
1863(b)(2) (2012). United States v. Green, 389 F. Supp. 2d 29, 65–66 (D. Mass. 2005).
99. Green, F. Supp. 2d at 75–77.
100. In re United States, 426 F.3d at 7–8, 16.
101. United States v. Hernandez-Estrada, No. 10cr0558 BTM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
32157 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2011), aff’d., 704 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2012), aff’d. en banc, 749 F.3d 
1154 (9th Cir. 2014); United States v. Garcia-Arellano, Case. No. 08cr-2876 BTM (S.D. Cal. 
June 9, 2009).
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During this decade, the District saw significant growth in its His-
panic population. According to the 2000 census, Hispanics were 
28.9% of the District’s total population, 24.8% of the 18+ popula-
tion, and 17.8% of the 18+ citizen population (Table 2).102 In 2009, 
those percentages grew to 33.7%, 29.3%, and 22.5% respectively 
(Table 3).103












Total Population 2,813,833 142,361 2,956,194 —
Hispanic 750,965 102,817 853,782 28.9
African American 154,487 5,148 159,635 5.4
Total Population 18+ 2,090,172 97,615 2,187,787 —
Hispanic 475,519 66,170 541,689 24.8
African American 107,228 4,495 111,723 5.1
Total Population of 
Citizens 18+ 
1,789,814 75,398 1,865,212 —
Hispanic 285,739 45,472 331,211 17.8
African American 104,139 4,461 108,600 5.8
102. Id. This table was submitted to the court as part of Declaration of Jeffrey B. Abram-
son and Mary R. Rose in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Indictment, tbl.1a (on 
file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
103. See Declaration, supra note 102, tbl.1f.
104. Since the 2000 Census does not directly report citizenship status, we estimated the 
percentage of the 18+ population that were citizens in the Southern District from estimates 
taken from proportions listed in Summary File 4 available on www.census.gov (Table PCT 
44).
FALL 2018] Jury Selection in the Weeds 17












Total population 3,053,793 166,874 3,220,667
Hispanic 957,246 129,015 1,086,261 33.7
African American 146,550 5,361 151,911 4.7
Total Population 18 + 2,308,710 115,820 2,424,530
Hispanic 625,277 84,911 710,188 29.3
African American 108,103 4,725 112,828 4.7
Total Population of 
Citizens 18+ 1,976,256 87,977 2,064,233
Hispanic 407,243 57,621 464,863 22.5
African American 103,260 4,720 107,981 5.2
Given these changing demographics, we alerted the court that 
the 2000 census was outdated, and we provided a series of updates 
of the District’s jury-eligible population, as it existed at the time 
that each of the MJWs was filled.105
Unlike Massachusetts but like most federal districts, the South-
ern District relied exclusively on voter registration records as a ju-
ror source list. This created its own immediate problem, since Cali-
fornia at the time had a greater portion of non-Hispanic whites 
registered to vote (72.9%) than African Americans (67.2%) or
Hispanics (62.8%).106 In such a situation, the JSSA would seem to 
require a district to supplement the voter registration with some 
other source of juror names in order to assure fair representa-
tion.107 Unless such supplementation occurs, the ideal of repre-
sentative juries is more honored in the breach than in the ob-
servance.
However, in each of our two challenges in the Southern District 
of California, Judge Barry T. Moskowitz rejected the defense mo-
tion for supplementation. As a matter of policy, Judge Moskowitz 
expressed sympathy for the defense position, going so far as to say,
105. We relied on updated figures that the Census Bureau provides through its annual 
American Community Survey. We provided this data for each of the jury wheels studied 
from 1999 through 2009.
106. We took these figures from 2008, the year of the last presidential election before 
the District filled its 2009 jury wheel. See THOM FILE & SARAH CRESLEY, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
VOTING AND REGISTRATION IN THE NOVEMBER ELECTION OF 2008 tbl.4b (2012), 
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2008/demo/voting-and-registration/p20-562-rv.html.
107. See 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2) (2012).
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“that supplementation of the Southern District’s source list with 
[driver’s license] lists would result in greater inclusiveness, and po-
tentially, better representation of minority groups that do not reg-
ister to vote in the same proportion as non-Hispanic whites.”108
However, as a matter of law, he felt that Duren v. Missouri109 tied his 
hands. Duren famously created a three-pronged test for violations 
of the Sixth Amendment or the JSSA.110 To find a violation, a judge 
must find that (1) a cognizable group is underrepresented in the 
jury venires; (2) that the amount of underrepresentation is not fair 
or reasonable; and (3) the cause of the underrepresentation is 
some defect in the jury plan that systematically excludes members 
of the cognizable group.
Applying Duren, the judge found that African Americans and 
Hispanics were clearly cognizable groups.111 However, citing to ex-
isting precedents in the Ninth Circuit and elsewhere, he found 
that these groups were “fairly” represented on the MJW and that 
any disparity between their percentage of the population and the 
MJW was not “substantial” enough to require supplementation un-
der the terms of the JSSA or Sixth Amendment.112
When does underrepresentation become significant enough to 
trigger a violation of Duren’s second prong? Ultimately, this is a le-
gal rather than a mathematical question.113 Unfortunately, at the 
time, the Southern District of California—as in most federal juris-
dictions—minimized the amount of lost representation by measur-
ing the loss using the “absolute disparity” test.114
108. United States v. Garcia-Arellano, Case. No. 08cr-2876 BTM, at *16 (S.D. Cal. June 9, 
2009).
109. 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
110. Id. at 364.
111. United States v. Garcia-Arellano, Case. No. 08cr-2876 BTM, at *3 (S.D. Cal. June 9, 
2009).
112. United States v. Hernandez-Estrada, No. 10cr0558 BTM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
32157, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2011) (holding that under existing law, disparities not great 
enough “to support a conclusion of underrepresentation.”); See also United States v. Garcia-
Arellano, Case. No. 08cr-2876 BTM, at *7 (S.D. Cal. June 9, 2009) (noting that the “Ninth 
Circuit has declined to find underrepresentation of a distinctive group in the jury pool”
where the amount of underrepresentation was even greater than it is in the present case).
113. See Richard M. Re, Jury Poker: A Statistical Analysis of the Fair Cross-Section Requirement,
8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 533, 540 (2011).
114. United States v. Garcia-Arellano, Case. No. 08cr-2876 BTM, at *7 (S.D. Cal. June 9, 
2009) (following binding Ninth Circuit precedent at the time that “absolute disparity” was
the proper test, and citing to United States v. Rodriguez–Lara, 421 F.3d 932, 943 (9th Cir. 
2005)); see also United States v. Davis, 854 F.3d 1276, 1295 (11th Cir. 2017); United States v. 
Orange, 447 F.3d 792, 798 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Royal, 174 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 
1999) (“We accordingly employ the absolute disparity test . . . .”); United States v. Rioux, 97 
F.3d 648, 655 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[T]he law in this Circuit strongly suggests the absolute dispar-
ity/absolute numbers approach is appropriate in this case.”); United States v. Bates, No. 05-
81027, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117073, at *25 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 15, 2009) (“[M]ost courts ap-
ply the ‘absolute disparity’ standard.”); Commonwealth v. Arriaga, 438 Mass. 556, 565 
(2003) (“Consistent with the majority of jurisdictions, we apply the absolute disparity test to 
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Absolute disparity (AD) is an arithmetic approach: If a group 
makes up 10% of the jury-eligible population but only 5% of the 
jury wheels, then the disparity is 5%. In other words, AD uses sub-
traction to calculate the loss of fair representation (10%-5% = 5%).
The best measure of underrepresentation will be one that pro-
vides the most practical information about the harm that is done to 
a defendant’s chances of drawing a representative jury. Absolute 
disparity does not provide that guidance. It does not take into ac-
count a group’s size.115 As numerous commentators and courts 
have observed, it both overstates insignificant disparities of large 
groups and understates significant disparities of small groups.116 If 
one group is 75% of the population and 70% of the jury pool, and 
another group is 10% of the population and 5% of the jury pool, 
the absolute disparity for both groups comes out to be 5%. But 
clearly these instances of underrepresentation are quite different. 
The same absolute disparity will have a far greater impact on fair 
representation of the latter group than the former. In other words, 
absolute disparity records identical results in wholly different cir-
cumstances. The chances that a representative of a group will be 
empaneled on a jury decline by half in the 10% minus 5% exam-
ple, whereas the chances of a representative from a group that is 
75% of the population, but only 70% of the jury pool, decline by 
less than 7%.
Problems with the absolute disparity test are compounded by the 
traditional rule that the absolute disparity must exceed a 10% 
threshold for it to be constitutionally suspect.117 From a legal point 
of view, such a mathematically arbitrary threshold makes no sense. 
It would justify, or at least tolerate, the complete absence of minor-
ity groups from the jury pool in any county where the minority’s
determine whether underrepresentation of a group is substantial.”); Commonwealth v. 
Prater, 431 Mass. 86, 92 (2000) (“The majority of courts have looked to the absolute dispari-
ty test to determine whether underrepresentation of a group is substantial . . . .”). For a fur-
ther list of jurisdictions using the absolute disparity test, see R. Darcy & Brett M. Stingley, 
Statistical Criticism of Jury Selection Methods in the Western District of Oklahoma, 30 BUFF. PUB. INT.
L.J. 5, 8 n.14 (2012).
115. Hernandez-Estrada, 749 F.3d at 1162.
116. See, e.g., Brief for Social Scientists, Statisticians, and Law Professors Jeffrey Fagan et 
al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 12–19, Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314 
(2010).
117. See, e.g., United States v. Murphy, No. 94 CR 794, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8488, at *9 
(N.D. Ill. June 17, 1996) (“The ‘10% discrepancy’ standard has been adopted and applied 
by the Seventh Circuit in numerous cases . . . .”); Blair v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. App. 4th 
532, 541 (2004) (“[O]ur Supreme Court consistently relies on the absolute disparity test and 
‘no case has found a significant disparity utilizing that test with a less [than] 10% absolute 
disparity.’” In Garcia-Arellano, the judge relied on Ninth Circuit precedents where the court 
had treated absolute disparities up to 7.7% as insubstantial. United States v. Garcia-Arellano, 
No. 08cr-2876 BTM, at *4 (S.D. Cal. June 9, 2009) (citing United States v. Rodriguez-Lara, 
421 F.3d 932, 943 (9th Cir. 2005)).
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percentage of the jury-eligible population was 10% or less to begin 
with.118 For instance, the entire African-American population in the 
Southern District of California is less than 10% of the total popula-
tion.119
An alternative method, known as comparative disparity (CD), is 
better than absolute disparity as a measure of the significance of 
departures from fair representation.120 While absolute disparity 
measures the difference between a group’s percentage of the gen-
eral population and its percentage of the jury wheel, comparative 
disparity calculates the decreased likelihood that members of such 
a group will be called for a given jury.121 To return to our previous 
example of a group falling from its 10% share of the population to 
a 5% share of the jury wheel, the absolute disparity test mistakenly 
uses subtraction to calculate the disparity as 5%. The comparative 
disparity test correctly takes a proportional approach to see that 
50% of the group’s members have disappeared from the jury pool 
[(10%-5%) /10% = 50%].
Comparative disparity, therefore, assists a court in focusing on 
the legal question at hand: How have the odds of drawing a repre-
sentative jury changed when the deck (the jury pool) is stacked 
against representing a particular group from the outset? However, 
only a minority of districts utilize comparative disparity. Among the 
jurisdictions that consider comparative data are the Third122,
Fifth123, Ninth124, and Tenth125 Circuits.
In our challenges in the Southern District of California, we pre-
sented the court with measures of both absolute and comparative 
disparities.126 We stressed that the use of the voter registration list 
118. See Hernandez-Estrada, 749 F.3d at 1162 (indicating that given small African-
American population in the federal District of Montana, the absolute disparity test would 
excuse the complete absence of that population from the jury wheel).
119. See supra Table 3.
120. See Hernandez-Estrada, 749 F.3d at 1163 (citing Hirst v. Gertzen, 676 F.2d 1252, 1258 
n.14 (9th Cir. 1982), for cases in which the comparative disparity test is “more informative.”)
Note, however, that the comparative disparity method tends to exaggerate loss of propor-
tional representation when the aggrieved group is a small percentage of the community 
population. Thus, if a group is two members of a four-person community, then the loss of a 
single person will translate into a comparative disparity of 50%. See Hernandez-Estrada, 749 F. 
3d at 1163.
121. United States v. Chanthadara, 230 F.3d 1237, 1257 (10th Cir. 2000).
122. Ramseur v. Beyer, 983 F.2d 1215, 1231 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc) (approving of the 
use of multiple tests).
123. Mosley v. Dretke, 370 F.3d 467, 479 n.5 (5th Cir. 2004) (“[I]f the distinctive group 
at issue makes up less than 10% of the population, comparative disparity may be used.”).
124. Hernandez-Estrada, 749 F.3d at 1164–65.
125. United States v. Orange, 447 F.3d 792, 798 (10th Cir. 2006) (“[W]e have consistent-
ly relied upon two measurements: absolute and comparative disparity.”).
126. In the Conclusion, I consider a third measure of disparity based on the binomial 
theorem that may be superior to both comparative and absolute disparity methods as a way 
of capturing a defendant’s chances of drawing a representative jury. See infra Conclusion. 
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was not the only or even major source of the disparities, but that 
attrition mounted as the MJW morphed into the AJW and QJW.
Table 4 summarizes the attrition.127 When we combined undeliver-
able questionnaires with non-response to presumably delivered 
forms, we found that from 25.2% (in 2005) to 40.2% (in 2009) of 
potential jurors disappeared.
TABLE 4: RETURN STATUS OF JURY WHEELS







2009 116,000 69,375 (59.81%) 46,625 (40.19%) 40,743 
(35.12%)
2007 124,500 79,306 (63.70%) 45,194 (36.30%) 45,755 
(36.75%)
2005 104,441 78,080 (74.76%) 26,361 (25.24%) 45,907 
(43.95%)
2003 53,000 33,629 (63.45%) 19,371 (36.55%) 18,662 
(35.21%)
2001 63,500 45,203 (71.19%) 18,297 (28.81%) 32,697 
(51.49%)
1999 25,000 16,505 (66.02%) 8,495 (33.98%) 9,808 
(39.23%)
Combined 486,441 322,098 (66.22%) 158,502 (32.58%) 193,572 
(39.79%)
Crucially, the losses were disproportionate among African Amer-
icans and Hispanics, as compared to non-Hispanic whites. As Ta-
bles 5 shows, in 2009 Hispanics were 22.5% of the 18+ citizen pop-
ulation but only 17.66% of the AJW.
Table 6 presents comparable African-American percentages on 
the AJW and QJW. The jury questionnaire sent to prospective fed-
eral jurors asks them to report both their race and their Hispanic 
ethnicity status.128 Since the average response rate to the race ques-
Justice Breyer has expressed interest in this method. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, 
Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314 (2010) (No. 08-1402) (“[T]he only way you could figure 
out . . . what’s what here is you use something called [the] binomial theorem”).
127. Table 4 is based on data submitted to court in Declaration of Jeffrey B. Abramson 
and Mary R. Rose, supra note 102.
128. The jury questionnaire contains one question asking prospective jurors to report 
their race and a second question asking whether they are Hispanic. See Juror Qualification 
Questionnaire (Sample), U.S. DIST. CT., at 10a, 10b, https://www.prd.uscourts.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/ajax/QualificationQuestionnaireWithInstructions.pdf (last visited 
Aug. 29, 2018). Accompanying instructions tell them that “[f]ederal law requires you, as a 
prospective juror to indicate your race/ethnicity.” Id. Nevertheless, on average over all the 
jury wheels studied, only 60% of people who returned their questionnaires answered the 
Hispanic ethnicity question. See Declaration of Jeffrey B. Abramson and Mary R. Rose, supra 
note 102, at tbl.3. (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). The low rate 
of response, together with the fact that those who answered the question were a self-selected 
rather than random sample, made calculations of Hispanic percentages difficult. When we 
excluded unknowns and calculated the percentage of self-identified Hispanics from only 
those who answered the Hispanic question, the results spuriously overrepresented Hispanics 
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tion was much higher than the response rate to the Hispanic ques-
tion (82% versus 60%),129 we could present the court with more re-
liable data about African-American percentages, both in relation to 
the pool of all persons returning questionnaires and also in rela-
tion to the smaller pool of persons returning their questionnaires 
who answered the race question.
TABLE 5: MEASUREMENT OF DISPARITIES BETWEEN HISPANICS AS 
PERCENTAGE OF THE CITIZEN POPULATION (18 +) AND HISPANICS AS 
PERCENTAGE OF JURY WHEELS, 1999–2009




Percent of All 
Questionnaires
AD CD Percent of All 
Questionnaires
AD CD
2009 22.5 17.66 4.84 21.51 16.26 6.24 27.73
2007 20.9 15.83 5.07 24.26 14.99 5.91 28.28
2005 19.7 13.68 6.02 30.56 13.41 6.29 31.93
2003 18.8 14.63 4.17 22.18 14.49 4.31 22.93
2001 17.8 8.27 9.53 53.54 5.76 12.04 67.64
1999 17.8 10.35 7.45 41.85 10.37 7.43 41.74
on the jury wheels. Therefore, we arrived at our calculations in Table 5 by counting the 
number of people who returned their questionnaires and identified as Hispanic, and then 
divided this number by the total number of returned questionnaires. In our jury challenge, 
the judge rejected the FD’s argument that Section 1864(a) of the JSSA required the jury 
clerk to return for completion any questionnaire that omitted answering the Hispanic ques-
tion. See United States v. Garcia-Arellano, Case. No. 08cr-2876 BTM, at *12–13 (S.D. Cal. 
June 9, 2009). For similar problems with missing data on Hispanic prospective jurors, see
Rose et al., supra note 45, at 393–95.
129. See Declaration of Jeffrey B. Abramson and Mary R. Rose, United States v. Hernan-
dez-Estrada, supra note 102, at 3, 15, tbl.3.
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3.10 3.56 3.58 3.82
5.8
(1999)













Examining Table 6 further, specifically column one or two for 
the AJW, or column three or four for the QJW, there is a dramatic 
disappearance of African Americans, as compared to the percent-
age of African Americans in the 18+ citizen population.
Despite overwhelming evidence for our Southern District of Cal-
ifornia challenge, Judge Moskowitz followed precedent and used 
only the absolute disparity test.130 As a result, since the test showed 
that the lost representation for African Americans and Hispanics 
was less than disparities the Ninth Circuit had previously tolerat-
ed,131 he denied the defendant’s challenge.132
After Judge Moskowitz’s first decision rejecting our jury chal-
lenge,133 the Supreme Court decided Berghuis v. Smith.134 In a sec-
ond challenge to the underrepresentation of African Americans 
and Hispanics in the Southern District of California, the FD point-
ed to passages in Berghuis, where the Court stated that it had never 
mandated use of the absolute disparity test, and specifically criti-
cized the 10% rule.135 However, Judge Moskowitz concluded that 
130. United States v. Garcia-Arellano, Case. No. 08cr-2876 BTM, at *4 (S.D. Cal. June 9, 
2009); Hernandez-Estrada, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32157, at *6.
131. Hernandez-Estrada, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32157, at *6.
132. Id.
133. United States v. Garcia-Arellano, Case. No. 08cr-2876 BTM (S.D. Cal. June 9, 2009).
134. 559 U.S. 314 (2010).
135. Hernandez-Estrada, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32157, at *8 (citing Berghuis, 559 U.S. at 
329–31); accord Berghuis, 559 U.S. at 329 n.4 (“Under the rule the State proposes, the Sixth 
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he was bound to continue with the absolute disparity method, until 
the Ninth Circuit abandoned it.136 Therefore, finding that nothing
had significantly changed since our earlier jury challenge, he re-
jected the renewed challenge.
In an en banc decision, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal 
of the jury challenge, even while granting us a partial victory by 
overruling its own precedents that required courts to use the abso-
lute disparity method. Since “African Americans constituted only 
5.2% of the population of the Southern District in 2009,” the court 
wrote, “under the absolute disparity test, there could be no success-
ful jury challenge in the Southern District for African Americans, 
given precedents tolerating absolute disparities as large as 7.7%.”137
For this reason, “it [was] appropriate to abandon the absolute dis-
parity approach.”138
Even though the defendant won the battle over the proper 
mathematical test, he still lost the war over his jury challenge. 
Turning to the third prong of the Duren test, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that, even assuming the underrepresentation of African 
Americans and Hispanics was substantial, the defense failed to 
“provide evidence that this underrepresentation is due to the system
employed by the Southern District.”139 According to the court, the 
defendant had “not provided sufficient evidence ‘linking sole reli-
ance on voter registration lists for jury selection to current system-
atic exclusion of [distinctive groups] in the [Southern District].’”140
In other words, Hernandez had “not shown that the alternative sys-
tem he proposes—[supplementing the juror source list]—would 
increase [minority group] representation.”141
From our point of view, it was unfortunate that neither the trial 
judge nor the full bench of the Ninth Circuit focused on the de-
fense’s data showing loss of representation not just from the use of 
the voter registration list but also, and arguably more significantly, 
from the inability of the system to retain minority jurors through 
later stages of jury selection. Table 4 shows that, over a decade of 
jury wheels, the Southern District’s jury plan systematically tolerat-
ed losing 32.58% of persons on average, due to undeliverable mail 
Amendment offers no remedy for complete exclusion of distinct groups in communities 
where the population of the distinct group falls below the 10 [%] threshold.”) (citation 
omitted).
136. Hernandez-Estrada, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32157, at *8.
137. Hernandez-Estrada, 749 F.3d at 1161, 1164.
138. Id. at 1164.
139. Id. at 1166 (emphasis added).
140. Id. (changes in original) (quoting United States v. Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.3d 932, 
945 (9th Cir. 2005)).
141. Id. (changes in original) (quoting Randolph v. California, 380 F.3d 1133, 1141 (9th 
Cir. 2004)).
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or failures of response to delivered juror questionnaires. Tables 5 
and 6 show the disproportionate impact these problems had on 
maintaining fair representation for Hispanics and African Ameri-
cans respectively.
Sub silentio, both the trial judge and appellate bench assumed 
that problems with the mechanics of successfully summonsing ju-
rors do not count as the kind of systematic exclusions that the Du-
ren test requires. Part VIII returns to an in-depth examination of 
that which does and does not amount to systematic defects in a jury 
plan. For now, I simply note that the Ninth Circuit was in line with 
jurisdictions that dismiss problems with non-response to a jury 
summons or with undeliverable mail as the fault of private individ-
uals for ignoring their summonses or failing to update their ad-
dresses, rather than the fault of the government’s jury plan. The 
intuition was that the jury plan wanted to include persons who, by 
their own choice, excluded themselves.142
V. NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
On behalf of the defendant in United States v. Roceaser Ivy, we an-
alyzed two wheels in the Northern District of Illinois (2007 and 
2009).143 Over objections from the U.S. Attorney’s office, the trial 
judge granted us access to court records on the composition of the 
District’s jury wheels.144 At the time, the District relied solely on the 
voter registration list as a source of potential jurors.
An MJW filled with the names of registered voters only is bound 
to reflect the lower rates at which minorities register to vote as 
compared to the rates for non-Hispanic whites. However, just as in 
142. See discussion infra Part VII, as well as text accompanying note 192, for criticism of 
this intuition.
143. United States v. Ivy, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9347 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 1, 2011); see also 
Transcript of Proceedings, United States v. Ivy, No. 1-10-CR00496 (N.D. Ill. 2011) at 2–3 (on 
file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). The judge issued a protective order 
limiting use of jury records to the needs of the defendant. Memorandum Order, United 
States v. Ivy, No. 1:10-CR-00496 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal 
of Law Reform). However, since that time, the Northern District of Illinois has released data 
from the 2009 jury wheel for public research purposes. See Rose et al., supra note 45, at 404
app. Therefore, I use data from 2009 in this Article, but not from 2007.
144. In granting the defense access to jury records, the trial judge remarked,
You know, let me tell you, I lived through the—as you might guess, the up-
dated confirmation by our District Court of the existing jury plan, but I can assure 
you that it was on our agenda as one of the items that really did not get, frankly, a 
lot of attention. What we were really doing was confirming something that had 
been in existence for a long time. And I can tell you right now nobody really took 
a look at whether the system continued to make sense, relying, remember, on 
something that is now 25 years [old]. Transcript of Hearing, Ivy, No. 1:10-CR-
00496.
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the Southern District of California, the underrepresentation built 
into the voter registration list was small in the Northern District of 
Illinois. When measured using the absolute disparity method fa-
vored by the federal judiciary, the disparity between African Amer-
icans’ percentage on the registered voters list and their percentage 
of the jury-eligible population was less than two percent.145 The 
same held true for Hispanics.













9.5 7.9 1.6% 16.84%
Hispanics 
(in Illinois)








14.5 13.4 1.1% 7.58%
The story was entirely different when we investigated the com-
position of the AJW and QJW. Table 8 shows that the Northern 
District experienced the same issues with undeliverable mail and 
failures to respond that were present in the Eastern Division of the 
District of Massachusetts and the Southern District of California.
TABLE 8: UNDELIVERABLE MAIL/NON-RESPONSE RATES
Pool Summoned Responded Undeliverable No Response Qualified Wheel
(Percent of Summoned/ 
Percent of Responses)








While the non-response rate (33.37%) appeared to be high and 
the undeliverable rate (6.49%) appeared to be low, the total was in 
line with rates reported nationally.146
145. Data in Table 7 is based on Voting and Registration in the Election of November, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU at tbl.4(b) (2008) https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2008/demo/
voting-and-registration/p20-562-rv.html. The 2008 voter registration figures are the appro-
priate ones against which to measure the representativeness of the 2009 jury wheels.
146. See discussion infra Part VIII, and text accompanying notes 213–32.
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How do these attrition factors affect retention of prospective 
minority jurors? To answer that question, we analyzed the personal 
information provided on returned jury questionnaires. Just as in 
the Southern District of California challenge, we ran into a prob-
lem of incomplete data. While nearly 93% of respondents specified 
a race, less than 78% of respondents bothered to answer the His-
panic ethnicity question. Table 9 shows the results.






Who Did Not 
Identify a Race
Number (Percent)
Who Did Not Answer 
Yes/No to Hispanic 
Identity
2009 20,374 1,578 (7.75%) 4,523 (22.20%)
Given the large numbers of persons on the AJW whose Hispanic 
ethnicity was unknown, we did not attempt to calculate the per-
centage of Hispanic-identifying people on the AJW.147 However, the 
much higher rate of response to the race question permitted us to
analyze the racial composition of the AJWs and QJWs for 2009. As 
Table 10 shows, we calculated the percentage of African Americans 
from the number of all persons returning their questionnaires (col-
umns two and four of Table 10) and also from only those specify-
ing a race (columns three and five of Table 10). Since nearly 93% 
of persons remaining on the AJW and QJW reported their race, the
difference between the two calculations was small.
147. See Rose et al., supra note 45, at 392 (“imputational methods are not available” for 
dealing with large number of prospective jurors who do not answer the Hispanic identity 
question).
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TABLE 10: DISPARITIES BETWEEN AFRICAN-AMERICAN PERCENTAGE 
OF THE POPULATION AND AFRICAN-AMERICAN PERCENTAGE ON THE 
AJW AND QJW
Percent of 





Percent of AJW 
(of Those 
Reporting Race)
Percent of QJW 
(of All Returns)
Percent of QJW 
(of Those 
Reporting Race)









The import of Table 10 is best understood by considering the 
CD measurements of lost representation, which are shown in the 
last row of the table. Nearly one-third (sometimes even more than 
one-third) of the expected number of African-American prospec-
tive jurors disappeared from the Available and Qualified Jury 
Wheels in 2009. While drawing names of prospective jurors only 
from the list of registered voters was one factor causing minority 
attrition, it was not the major factor (Table 7). Whereas the AD be-
tween African Americans in the jury-eligible population and Afri-
can-American registered voters was 1.1% (CD of 7.58%) in 2008,
the disparity grew to 7.09% AD (36.36% CD) on the AJW (Table 
7).148 This result conforms with the results from the Eastern Divi-
sion for the District of Massachusetts and Southern District of Cali-
fornia challenges—namely, that difficulties with mailing out sum-
monses to correct addresses and having recipients return them 
disproportionately leads to the loss of minority representation on 
the AJW.
In the end, the defendant pleaded guilty to reduced charges and 
the judge never ruled on our jury challenge.149 Fortunately, this was 
not the end of the matter. In 2013, the Northern District amended 
its jury plan to deal with many of the problems we had pointed 
out.150 To address the problems of undeliverable mail and non-
response, the District followed Massachusetts in ordering targeted-
zip-code replacement mailings.151 For every undeliverable qualifica-
tion questionnaire, the Court immediately sent a replacement 
148. These figures are for all names on the AJW. See supra Table 10 (columns two and 
four). Comparable figures for only those names on the AJW whose race was known would be 
6.05% for AD and 31.03% for CD. See supra Table 10 (columns three and five).
149. United States v. Ivy, No. 10 CR 496, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123603 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 
26, 2011).
150. See generally NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS PLAN, supra note 41 (supplementing 
the voter registration list with other sources of juror names and instituting reforms to deal 
with undeliverable mail and non-response to jury questionnaires).
151. Id. § 7(b) at 5.
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questionnaire to another person residing in the same zip code.152
The Northern District went beyond Massachusetts in using target-
ed-zip-code replacements for every questionnaire that failed to elic-
it a response to two requests.153 Given the hyper-segregation by zip 
code in many parts of the District, which includes Chicago, the 
idea was to increase the likelihood of replacing lost jurors due to 
mail or non-response with jurors of the same race or ethnicity. In 
addition, the District began supplementing the voter registration 
list with the state driver’s license list and state-issued photo identi-
fication records in 2013. In 2017, the District expanded its source 
lists to include names of unemployment benefits applicants. These 
reforms will be addressed in Parts VII and VIII.
VI. MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA, ORLANDO DIVISION
In 2009, the Federal Defenders of the Middle District of Florida, 
Orlando Division, hired sociologist Mary Rose and me to assist with 
a jury challenge in a then-pending criminal case.154 The FD did not 
pursue that challenge but retained us in connection with a second 
case in 2010.155 In the course of doing that research, the FD put us 
in contact with a private attorney who brought a similar jury venire 
challenge on behalf of defendant, Robert Edward Pritt.156 In this 
Article, we draw upon our research for the FD, as well as on the 
public records from United States v. Pritt.
Jury selection in the Orlando Division followed the same script 
as in the Southern District of California and the Northern District 
of Illinois. Like those districts, the Orlando Division relied exclu-
sively on the voter registration list to fill its MJW.157 However, Afri-
can Americans and Hispanics were a smaller percentage of regis-
tered voters in the Orlando Division than they were of the jury-
eligible population. In 2009, African Americans were 12.5% of the 
Orlando Division 18+ citizen population and Hispanics were 
15.3%.158 However, according to the Florida Department of State, 
Division of Elections, African Americans were only 11.53% of Or-
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. In re John McCullah, No. 5:05-Mj-44-Oc-GRJ (M.D. Fla. 2009).
155. Complaint as to Elaine Joseph, United States v. Joseph, No. 6:09-cr-00260-GAP-KRS-
1 (M.D. Fla. 2009), ECF No. 1.
156. See United States v. Pritt, No. 6:09-cr-110-Orl-28KRS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63470 
(M.D. Fla. June 8, 2010).
157. Id. at *4–5. See discussion infra Part VII for changes in the source lists used in the 
Northern District of Illinois since our challenge.
158. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY FOR 2009; see also infra Table 
11.
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lando citizens registered to vote in the November 2008 presidential 
election, while Hispanics comprised 13.8% of the Division’s regis-
tered voters.159 Thus, the Division’s MJW somewhat underrepre-
sented these groups from the beginning. This was true in 2005, 
2007, and 2009.160 To take 2009, the final year we studied, African 
Americans were 12.5% of the Division’s jury-eligible population 
and 11.44% of the MJW. Hispanics were 15.3% of Division’s jury-
eligible population and 13.72% of the MJW.161
However, the disparities were not vast, at least as measured by 
the absolute disparity test. The disparity between percentage of the 
population and percentage of the MJW was typically less than 
2%.162 In Pritt, the trial judge found this level of absolute disparity 
to be legally insignificant, since previous Eleventh Circuit decisions 
had found no problem with even greater disparities.163 Moreover, 
the judge noted that “[courts] are ‘in complete agreement that 
neither the [JSSA] nor the Constitution require that a supple-
mental source of names be added to voter lists simply because an 
identifiable group votes in a proportion lower than the rest of the 
population.’”164
Even if the judge was correct in finding the representation of Af-
rican Americans and Hispanics to be fair and reasonable on the
MJW, he should have gone on to consider the defendant’s princi-
pal complaint—that the subsequent attrition on the AJW and QJW 
required a remedy.
In connection with Pritt’s jury challenge, defense counsel ob-
tained access to court documents that tracked the racial and His-
panic status of all persons who completed and mailed back the jury 
qualification questionnaire.165 Relying on these documents, Pritt 
was able to show the impact of undeliverable mail and non-
response on retention of African Americans and Hispanics in the 
jury pool. For instance, in 2009, the jury clerk mailed out 51,306 
jury questionnaires to names randomly selected from the MJW.166
Overall, 54% of those questionnaires were returned.167 Likewise, 
159. The Florida Department of State, pursuant to a public records request, provided 
this registration data in connection with Pritt. See Defendant’s Motion and Memorandum to 
Stay Trial and Request Hearing at 5, United States v. Pritt, No. 6:09-cr-110-Orl-28KRS (M.D. 
Fla. 2010) [hereinafter “Pritt Motion”] (on file with court and the University of Michigan 
Journal of Law Reform).
160. See infra Table 11.
161. Id; see also Rose & Abramson, supra note 54, at 936 tbl.3.
162. See infra Table 11.
163. Pritt, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63470, at *19–21.
164. Id. at 14 (quoting United States v. Carmichael, 560 F.3d 1270, 1279 (11th Cir. 
2009)).
165. Pritt Motion, supra note 159, at *3, (on file with court and author).
166. Id. at 7.
167. Id.
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11.7% of mailed questionnaires were undeliverable.168 Another 
34% elicited no response.169
These factors of undeliverable mail and non-response had a dis-
proportionate effect on retention of African-American and Hispan-
ic jurors. Whereas the return rate of questionnaires mailed to 
whites was 62.7%,170 the return rate among African Americans was 
30.6%171 and among Hispanics was 36.6%.172
Pritt’s defense counsel performed a similar analysis for every jury 
wheel between 2003 and 2009. The white response rate never fell 
below 58.5%. The African-American return rate never exceeded 
40.3% and the Hispanic return rate never topped 46.4%.173 These 
figures include losses both from undeliverable summonses and 
non-responsiveness.
Table 11174 captures the cumulative loss of representation as jury 
selection moved from creating an MJW to filling the QJW. In 2009, 
African Americans were 12.5% of the jury-eligible population, 
11.44% of the MJW, but only 6.95% of the QJW.175 Likewise, His-
panics remained only 9.51% of the QJW, which was down from the 
13.72% share of the MJW and 15.3 % of the jury-eligible popula-
tion.176 In sum, the loss of minority representation from the MJW to 
the QJW was far greater than the loss occurring at the MJW stage. 
Whereas the loss of minority representation on the MJW was less 
than 2% AD,177 Table 11 shows the AD percentages for African 
Americans ranging from a low of 5.92% on the 2005 QJW to a high 
of 6.95% on the 2009 QJW. For prospective Hispanic jurors, the at-
trition on the QJW was even greater, ranging from a low of 7% AD 
in 2005 to a high of 9.51% in 2009.
168. Id. at 6 (5,996 out of 51,306).
169. Id at 7.
170. Id.
171. Id., Def. Ex. 43 (of 5,872 mailed questionnaires, only 1,795 came back) (on file with 
court and author).
172. Id. (2,575 returned out of the 7,043 mailed questionnaires).
173. For these calculations, see Calculations, Jury Wheels (2003-2009) 1–8. These calcu-
lations were done by Pritt’s attorney, Mark L. Horwitz (on file with court and the University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
174. Table 11 is adapted from Rose & Abramson, supra note 54, at 936 tbl.3, and from 
Pritt, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63470, at Def. Ex. 12 (Source List Race/Gender Report, Entire 
Source List, 2007).
175. See infra Table 11.
176. Id.
177. See text accompanying notes 161 and 162.
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TABLE 11: DISPARITIES BETWEEN THE QJW AND JURY-ELIGIBLE 
POPULATION178

















2009 11.44 12.5 6.95 5.55 
(44.4)
13.72 15.3 9.51 5.79 
(37.8)
2007 10.36 12.1 6.44 5.67 
(46.8)
12.35 13.8 8.34 5.43 
(39.4)
2005 9.87 11.2 5.92 5.28 
(47.1)
11.10 12.9 7.00 5.90 
(45.7)
When the defendant in Pritt pointed to undeliverable mail and 
non-response as key problems with retaining prospective minority 
jurors on the QJW, the judge responded as the judges in our Cali-
fornia and Illinois challenges had: The jury plan should not be 
faulted for the practical or administrative shortcomings that were 
likely to occur in any alternative jury plan.179 Ironically, the more 
convincing we were about the problems lurking within these so-
called administrative details, the more courts seemed to find com-
fort in treating the problems as ones we had to accept, no matter 
how much juror disenfranchisement takes place.
VII. REMEDIES FOR SOURCE LIST PROBLEMS: SUPPLEMENTING THE 
VOTER REGISTRATION LIST
No federal court has ever struck down a jury plan for relying on 
the voter registration list as the sole source of juror names.180 Just as 
in our jury challenges, courts nationally give remarkable safe har-
bor to voter-registration-based plans.181 They do so for two reasons:
First, judges do not find the levels of underrepresentation that are
built into reliance on the voter registration list substantial enough 
to trigger statutory or constitutional violations.182 Second, even if 
178. Figures for the MJW and QJW in Table 11 are taken from court documents provid-
ed to Pritt. See Pritt Motion, supra note 159, at 4–5.
179. United States v. Pritt, No. 6:09-cr-110-Orl-28KRS 2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis 63470, at 
*16–19 (M.D. Fla. June 8, 2010).
180. See United States v. Oldham, No. 12-20287, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57093, at *11 
(E.D. Mich. Apr. 24, 2014).
181. See, e.g., Preller, supra note 4, at 8.
182. United States v. Garcia-Arellano, Case. No. 08cr-2876 BTM, at *7–8 (S.D. Cal. June 
9, 2009).
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underrepresentation is found to be substantial, the judges lay the 
blame not on government action but instead on the private choice 
of individuals to effectively remove themselves from the juror rolls 
by failing to register to vote.183 As the judge described it when he
rejected our first challenge to the Southern District of California 
jury plan, “[d]efendant’s evidence falls far short of establishing 
that Hispanics or African Americans have been systematically ex-
cluded from registering to vote in this District.”184
By insulating voter registration jury lists from legal challenge, 
federal courts skirt the JSSA’s command to supplement the regis-
tration list when necessary to form representative jury venires.185
Federal courts also set aside the American Bar Association’s rec-
ommendation that a jury source list cover at least 85% of the eligi-
ble population.186 None of the districts that we studied met that 
standard. In our Southern District of California challenge, the 
judge noted that while voter registration had never exceeded 76% 
in the district, over 93% of district residents held a driver’s li-
cense.187
On the representation front, the good news is that the registra-
tion gap between whites and African Americans has significantly 
closed in recent years.188 The bad news is that a significant gap still 
exists between Hispanic and non-Hispanic white registration 
rates.189
If supplementing the voter registration list with other sources of 
juror names can eliminate these disparities, then courts should try 
supplementation.190 The stereotype of the nonvoter, as discussed
previously, is a person without the civic interests that society would 
183. United States v. Weaver, 267 F.3d 231, 244 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that defendant 
did not met his Duren burden of proving systematic exclusion of a minority group where 
“the underrepresented group has freely excluded itself quite apart from the system itself,” by 
failing to register to vote).
184. United States v. Garcia-Arellano, Case. No. 08cr-2876 BTM, at *9 (S.D. Cal. June 9, 
2009).
185. See 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2) (2012).
186. See William Caprathe et al., Assessing and Achieving Jury Pool Representativeness, 55 
JUDGES J. 16, 18 (2016).
187. United States v. Garcia-Arellano, Case. No. 08cr-2876 BTM, at *16 (S.D. Cal. June 9, 
2009). To be sure, as the judge noted, non-citizens can hold a driver’s license, so the im-
provement would not be quite as dramatic once we purge names of non-citizens from the 
driver’s license list.
188. See THOM FILE, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, THE DIVERSIFYING ELECTORATE—
VOTING RATES BY RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN IN 2012 (AND OTHER RECENT ELECTIONS) 3
fig.1 (2013).
189. See VOTING AND REGISTRATION IN THE ELECTION OF NOVEMBER, 2016 supra note 19, 
at tbl.4b for figures from the most recent (2016) presidential election.
190. See, e.g., Stephanie Domitrovich, Jury Source Lists and the Community’s Need to Achieve 
Racial Balance on the Jury, 33 DUQ. L. REV. 39, 42 (1994).
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want in a juror.191 But this is an incorrect assumption about the 
psychology of nonvoters. A 2008 Census Bureau survey found that 
only one-third of eligible Hispanics who had not registered to vote 
gave lack of interest as their reason. Among the other two-thirds, 
the most common reasons for not registering were missing the 
deadline, not knowing where to register, or not knowing how to 
register.192
The Northern District of Illinois has authorized me and my col-
league, sociologist Mary Rose, to study the effects of supplementa-
tion since its inception in 2013.193 To date, the court has publicly 
released preliminary data comparing African-American and His-
panic representation on the last two wheels, filled with the voter 
registration list from 2009 and 2011 only, with the inaugural two 
wheels that were filled with supplemental names from the driver’s
license list and state-issued identification list (2013 and 2015).194
No information is available yet on the changes introduced in 2017. 
The preliminary data shows improvement in African-American, but 
not Hispanic, representation.
A. African American Representation
The 2009 and 2011 MJWs straddled the 2010 Census of the pop-
ulation. In 2009, the MJW included 14.0% of the African-
American, 18+ population.195 The court compared this to 2000 
Census data, which showed African-Americans to be 17.3% of that 
population.196 This produced an absolute disparity of 3.3%. In 
2010, the new Census showed that the African-American, voting-
age population had increased to 19.5% of the District’s popula-
tion.197 The MJW was 12.6%.198 This left an absolute disparity of 
6.9%. On average, the last two wheels filled with the voter registra-
tion list only produced an absolute disparity of 5.1%.
191. See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text.
192. THOM FILE & SARAH CRESLEY, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, VOTING AND REGISTRATION IN 
THE ELECTION OF NOVEMBER, 2008 14 tbl.5 (2008).
193. Per contract with Federal Defenders of Northern Illinois (attorney
Beth Jantz) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). See also NORTHERN 
DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS PLAN, supra note 41.
194. Hon. Ruben Castillo, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the Northern Dist. of Ill., 
Address at the State & Federal Jury Representation Seminar (Feb. 23, 2017) (on file with the 
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By contrast, the two wheels that were filled with the help of driv-
er license lists and state-issued identifications did increase African-
American representation. In 2013, African-American representa-
tion increased to 15% (absolute disparity of 4.5%) and in 2015 to 
15.47% (absolute disparity of 4.03%).199 Thus, on average, the two 
wheels that were filled under the 2013 amended jury plan suc-
ceeded in decreasing the absolute disparity from 5.1% to 4%.
B. Hispanic Representation
As previously noted, a low rate of response (69%) to the ques-
tion about Hispanic identity on the jury questionnaire means that 
the data on Hispanics’ representation on the Northern District’s
jury wheels are incomplete.200 There are simply too many prospec-
tive jurors whose ethnicity is unknown. This may explain why the 
District’s own reports on Hispanic percentages tend to vary so 
much. For example, for the two wheels before the 2013 amended 
jury plan went into effect, the District strangely reported that His-
panics were 12.8% of the 2009 MJW at a time when Hispanics were 
actually only 12% of the District’s jury-eligible population.201 Then 
in 2011 the Hispanic percentage on the jury wheel slipped to 
10.7% at a time when their presence in the jury-eligible population 
had in fact increased.202 In the two wheels filled since supplementa-
tion began, there appeared to be a significant improvement at first,
when Hispanic representation increased to 15.5% in 2013.203 But 
then it declined to 12.9% of the 2015 MJW.204 Thus, until the num-
bers stabilize from one wheel to the next, we cannot say whether 
supplementation is increasing Hispanic representation on the jury 
wheel.
Nationally, more studies are needed to ascertain which source 
lists come closest to creating a truly representative MJW. The most 
common additional source is the driver’s license list.205 Other 
sources include state-issued identification cards, unemployment 
lists, or disability card lists.206 All but three states use multiple 
sources.207 Eight states do not use the voter registration list at all.208
199. Id.
200. See supra Table 9 for data for low response rates to questions about Hispanic status.




205. See Preller, supra note 4, at app.
206. Id.
207. Id.
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A particularly useful study would be one comparing jury selec-
tion in a federal district that uses only the voter registration list as a 
source of juror names with a state district covering some or all of 
the same counties that uses source lists in addition to, or in place 
of, the voting registration list. For instance, Orange County is with-
in both the federal Middle District of Florida and the state Elev-
enth Judicial Circuit. The state court uses the lists of licensed driv-
ers and state-issued photo identification cards as source lists, while 
the federal court uses the voter registration list alone.
Most, but not all, studies show supplementation is promising.209
A 2004 study in Oklahoma found that African Americans made up
a greater percentage of the lists of persons holding either a state 
driver’s license or a state-issued identification card (9.41%) than 
they were of the voter registration list (5.22%).210 As authors of the 
Oklahoma study noted, “[t]he relatively high proportion of Blacks 
appearing on the DPS [Department of Public Safety] licensee lists 
suggests that supplementation from such lists would contribute to 
reducing Black juror underrepresentation due to registered voter 
lists.”211
Similarly, in Oregon, the jury clerk reported “reviews have 
shown that the [Department of Motor Vehicle] lists provide better 
demographic coverage in each county than any other list readily
available, including the voter registration list . . . if used singly.”212
Oregon courts conducted an experiment, comparing use of the 
voter registration list alone to supplementation of that list with the 
driver’s license list. The experiment showed that the driver’s li-
208. Id. With few exceptions, the JSSA requires federal courts to use the voter registra-
tion list or the list of actual voters. However, the act permits supplementation of those lists.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2) (2012).
209. Studies conducted before the attacks on September 11, 2001 may no longer be reli-
able, since the need to have a government-issued photo identification card has increased 
since then. In that regard, it is worth noting that the Northern District of Illinois elected to 
start using lists of licensed drivers and state-issued ID holders in 2013, even though a pre-
September 11th study in that same district cast some doubt on the efficacy of supplementa-
tion. See Ted C. Newman, Fair Cross-Sections and Good Intentions: Representation in Federal Juries,
18 JUSTICE J. 211, 212, 221–22 (1996) (indicating that results of 1994 study were mixed, 
showing an improvement in Hispanic representation but a decline in African-American 
presence). For another pre-September 11th study doubting that supplementation works, see
John P. Bueker, Jury Source Lists: Does Supplementation Really Work?, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 390, 
410 (1997).
210. Darcy & Stingley, supra note 114, at 26.
211. Id.
212. Jade, supra note 23, at 570 n.97 (quoting letter from jury clerk) (emphasis in origi-
nal); see also Dennis Bilecki, Program Improves Minority Group Representation on Federal Juries, 77
JUDICATURE 221, 222 (1994) (“[T]he use of driver record information to supplement voter 
record information [when compiling juror source lists] . . . improve[s] representation of 
blacks, Hispanics, and Asians . . . .”).
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cense list picked up substantial numbers of eligible jurors that the 
registered voter list had excluded.213
The majority of federal districts remain wedded to voter registra-
tion-only jury plans, long after the majority of state courts turned 
to multiple source lists. There appears to be no good reason for 
this continued holdout, especially when advances in technology al-
low for merging source lists while purging duplicate names.
VIII. REMEDIES FOR LOSS OF REPRESENTATION DUE TO 
UNDELIVERABLE MAIL/NON-RESPONSE
Parts III through VI reported that the greatest loss of cross-
sectional representation in our four jurisdictions occurred during 
the seemingly innocuous stages of mailing out and returning jury 
qualification forms. This is a process that did not intentionally dis-
criminate against any group and, yet, yielded a significantly lower 
percentage of prospective minority jurors than random selection 
of names from the MJW should have.
Yield is a problem nationally. In large urban jurisdictions, 15% 
of all jury questionnaires mailed are returned as undeliverable.214
Nationally, the undeliverable rate is 12%.215 Some urban courts 
have reported undeliverable rates as high as 50%.216 A study of one 
federal district in Michigan found that 18.27% of questionnaires
were undeliverable.217 In the 1990s, Los Angeles County reported 
its undeliverable rate to be 15%.218
Among questionnaires or summonses presumably delivered, an-
other 5.4% to 15% of prospective state court jurors fail to respond 
and appear.219 The non-response rate in federal court is 11%.220 In 
2006, the Southern Division of the Eastern District of Michigan 
recorded a non-response rate of 21.85%.221 Only 22% to 25% of 
those summoned in August of 1995 for jury duty in Dallas County 
213. Jade, supra note 23, at 663.
214. See MIZE ET AL., supra note 7, at 22 tbl.16.
215. See Caprathe et al., supra note 186, at 18.
216. Id. at 19.
217. United States v. Bates, No. 05-81027, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117073, at *36 tbl.6 
(E.D. Mich. Dec. 15, 2009) (representing average of surveyed countries).
218. Kelso, supra note 52, at 145.
219. MIZE ET AL., supra note 7, at 22 tbl.16.
220. Giuseppe M. Fazari, Targeting Noncompliant Jurors: Findings from a Comprehensive En-
forcement Program, in NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, TRENDS IN STATE COURTS 71 (2013),
https://www.courts.wa.gov/subsite/mjc/docs/2017/Targeting-Noncompliant-Jurors-
Findings-from-a-Comprehensive-Enforcement-Progr.pdf (representing an average of a sur-
vey of one hundred federal courts).
221. Bates, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117073, at *39 tbl.8 (representing an average of sur-
veyed counties).
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responded.222 In the Western District of Oklahoma (Oklahoma City 
Division), 26.89% of those summoned in 1993 did not respond.223
In the 1990s, Los Angeles County was reporting the worst yields, 
with a 36% non-response rate on top of a 15% undeliverable 
rate.224 Combining undeliverables with non-responders, 26% of 
persons summoned did not make it into the pool of available ju-
rors in one state judicial district in Michigan.225
By any measure, these are large numbers. They generate costly 
inefficiencies and free rider problems.226 However, violations of the 
Sixth Amendment or JSSA occur only if rates of non-response and 
undeliverable mail spike among minority groups. In fact, they 
do.227 In Wayne County, Michigan;228 Dallas County, Texas;229 Cook 
County (Chicago), Illinois;230 Suffolk County (Boston), Massachu-
setts;231 and Dane County, Wisconsin,232 the data show difficulties in 
222. Nancy J. King, Juror Delinquency in Criminal Trial in America, 1796–1996, 94 MICH. L.
REV. 2673, 2697 n.89 (1996).
223. Darcy & Stingley, supra note 114, at 21.
224. Kelso, supra note 52, at 1453. The study did find that a follow-up summons could 
improve the yield. Id.
225. King, supra note 222, at 2697 n.89 (citing G. THOMAS MUNSTERMAN, THIRD JUDICIAL 
CIRCUIT COURT, WAYNE COUNTY, MICHIGAN, A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT, JURY 
MANAGEMENT 9, 12 (Nat’l Ctr. For State Courts ed., 1995)).
226. The free rider problem occurs when summonsed jurors know they can safely ignore 
jury duty, relying on others to serve.
227. See United States v. Ortiz, 897 F. Supp. 199, 204 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (“First, many His-
panics are poor. Like other poor people, they are apt to move more frequently than the 
more affluent, with their mail not being forwarded to their new address. Secondly, poor 
people in general have less reliable mail service.”); see also Commonwealth v. Fryar, 680 
N.E.2d 901, 907 (Mass. 1997) (“[T]he representation of Blacks and Hispanics in the jury 
pool was adversely affected because the communities with the highest percentage of Blacks 
and Hispanics have the highest nonresponse rate.”).
228. See, e.g., United States v. Bates, No. 05-81027, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117073, at *40 
(“Wayne County [where the preponderance of the African-American population in the 
southern division of the Eastern District of Michigan lives] has a nonresponse rate nearly 
double the Division average.”). A study of the state court system reached similar results. See
PAULA L. HANNAFORD-AGOR & G. THOMAS MUNSTERMAN, THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF 
MICHIGAN JURY SYSTEM ASSESSMENT ii–iii, 14–15 (Nat’l Ctr. For State Courts ed., 2006) (non-
response rates disproportionately high among residents of predominantly African-American 
neighborhoods).
229. In a 1995 Dallas County survey, twice as many Hispanics as whites, about one in five, 
noted that difficulties in taking time off from work was a reason for avoiding jury duty.
Eades, supra note 17, at 1815–16.
230. United States v. Murphy, No. 94 CR 794, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8488, at *12 
(“[P]oor African-Americans failed to respond to jury notices at a much higher rate than 
wealthy whites.”).
231. Commonwealth v. Arriaga, 781 N.E.2d 1253, 1266 (Mass. 2003) (citing data show-
ing that “a disproportionate number of undeliverable summonses are addressed to inner 
city locations” where the majority of the state’s Hispanic residents live).
232. DANE COUNTY JURY STUDY COMM., FINAL REPORT 7 (1993) (one-third of the jury 
questionnaires sent to African Americans were undeliverable, compared to 14% of forms 
mailed to whites).
FALL 2018] Jury Selection in the Weeds 39
maintaining fair representation for minorities through the middle 
stages of jury selection.233
It is inconceivable that these levels of representation attrition 
should be legally tolerable. Yet, they are.234 The culprit is the wood-
en way in which judges apply the second and third prongs of the 
Duren test.235 In our challenges, judges found that while the de-
fendants easily satisfied the first Duren prong (African Americans 
and Hispanics are clearly cognizable groups), they failed to meet 
their burdens of proving that any underrepresentation is both sub-
stantial (the second Duren prong) and due to some systematic de-
fect in the jury plan (the third Duren prong).236
Part IV reviewed flaws in the way that the absolute disparity test 
calculates the difference between a group’s presence in the popu-
lation and its share of the jury wheel. We propose a new mathemat-
ical test for measuring disparities in the Conclusion to this Article. 
This Part criticizes the way in which courts repeatedly erect the 
“systematic exclusion” prong of the Duren test as a roadblock to 
remedying the loss of minority underrepresentation. There will be 
little progress toward “practicing what we preach” about the im-
portance of cross-sectional representation until courts expand 
their cramped understanding of systemic defects in a jury plan.237
233. See United States v. Barnes, No. 3:94CR112(AHN), 1996 WL 684388, at *5 (D. 
Conn. June 26, 1996) (“[U]nderrepresentation . . . results from the high rate of question-
naires mailed to Hispanic communities which are returned as undeliverable.”).
234. In United States v. Ivy, No. 10 CR 496, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123603 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 
26, 2011), the Assistant U.S. Attorney argued that “if you compare the population to the 
voters’ list [a]nd if there is not a huge disparity there, then that should be the end of the 
inquiry.” Transcript of Proceedings, United States v. Ivy, No. 1:10-CR-00496, at 20–21 (Feb. 
11, 2011) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). It is this position that 
leaves in place the major losses of fair representation that occur at later stages of jury selec-
tion.
235. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 370 (1979).
236. Id.
237. The reading of Duren’s systematic exclusion test used by all but one of the judges in 
our challenges fits a national pattern. See, e.g., Rivas v. Thaler, 432 F. App’x 395, 402–03 (5th 
Cir. 2011) (“[T]he fact that certain groups of persons called for jury service appear in num-
bers unequal to their proportionate representation in the community does not support Ri-
vas’s allegation that Dallas County systematically excludes them in its jury selection pro-
cess.”); Alexander v. Lafler, No. 11-10286, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87368, at *1, *22 (E.D. 
Mich. June 21, 2013) (“Non-responses to juror questionnaires and a court’s failure to put 
forth additional effort to obtain responses from potential jurors are generally not consid-
ered systematic exclusions of a group from jury service.”); People v. Currie, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
430, 435 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (finding no systematic exclusion where “the disparity in repre-
sentation is attributable to the disproportionately high rate of failure to appear by those 
summoned for service”), rev’d sub nom. Currie v. Adams, 149 F. App’x 615 (9th Cir. 2005), 
rev’d sub nom. Currie v. McDowell, 825 F.3d 603 (9th Cir. 2016); Kellogg v. Peterson, No. 
178760, 1996 WL 33362172, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 1996) (“That a certain segment of 
Detroit residents chose not to respond to questionnaires cannot be considered ‘inherent’ to 
the jury selection process.”).
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If one views jury selection through the lens of anti-
discrimination law, it is not the state’s fault that people move and 
do not leave a forwarding address. The state intends to summon ju-
rors fairly but plans go awry when the postal service returns so 
many summonses as undeliverable.238 For the same reason, courts 
find no systematic exclusion when prospective jurors make the 
choice to ignore summonses that are properly delivered.239
Of course, as a matter of law, courts need not find intentional 
discrimination in order to hold a district accountable for depar-
tures from the JSSA or Sixth Amendment cross-sectional require-
ment. However, in interpreting Duren’s mandate that litigants show 
a systematic exclusion of cognizable groups, courts frequently read 
an intent requirement back into Sixth Amendment analysis.240 Du-
ren’s conceptual distinction between “intentional discrimination”
and “systematic exclusion” was supposed to be clear. If the un-
derrepresentation flowed from some systematic defect in the 
court’s jury plan, then the government violated the Sixth Amend-
ment—whether it intended to discriminate or not. However, the 
difference between “exclusion” and “discrimination” is far from 
obvious, and courts understandably conflate the two.241 They im-
port the state action requirement,242 which is typical of equal pro-
tection analysis, into Sixth Amendment law. Courts do not treat 
supposedly private choices—registering to vote, updating mailing 
238. United States v. Oldham, No. 12-20287, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57093, at *10–11, *11 
n.1 (quoting United States v. Rioux, 97 F.3d 648, 658 (2d Cir. 1996) (“The inability to serve 
juror questionnaires because they were returned as undeliverable is not due to the system 
itself, but to outside forces, such as demographic changes.”)).
239. See, e.g., Bates v. United States, 473 Fed. App’x 446, 451 (6th Cir. 2012) (concluding 
that “[t]he only evidence in the record establishing a possible cause for the underrepresen-
tation of African-Americans is the non-response rate in Wayne County, which is more than 
double that of any other county. Non-responses, however, are not a problem ‘inherent’ to 
the jury selection procedures, but are the result of individual choice.”); United States v. 
Murphy, No. 94 CR 794, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8488, at *12 (“The jury selection system . . . is 
not excluding African-Americans as a group, but many African-American individuals are 
excluding themselves by not responding to jury questionnaires.”). For further discussion of 
attitudes towards jury duty, see also John Gramlich, Jury Duty is Rare But Most Americans See it 
as Part of Good Citizenship, PEW RESEARCH CTR. FACTTANK (Aug. 24, 2017), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/08/24/jury-duty-is-rare-but-most-americans-
see-it-as-part-of-good-citizenship (“Blacks and Hispanics are less likely than whites to see jury 
duty as a part of good citizenship, as are those with a high school diploma or less when 
compared with people with at least some college education.”).
240. For a similar argument, see Chernoff, supra note 27, at 151–54.
241. Id; see also United States v. Tuttle, 729 F.2d 1325, 1327 n.2 (11th Cir. 1984) (“The 
prima facie case under the equal protection clause is ‘virtually identical’ to that under the 
Sixth Amendment, and . . . the threshold disparity requirement [is] the same under both 
types of challenge.”).
242. An example of state action responsible for systematically excluding qualified jurors 
occurred in Connecticut when a glitch in the computer program coded eligible jurors as 
dead. See United States v. Jackman, 46 F.3d 1240, 1242–43 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing United 
States v. Osorio, 801 F. Supp. 966, 972–73 (D. Conn. 1992)).
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addresses or responding to jury summonses—as government ac-
tion.243 The result is to not address the problems responsible for 
the persistence of unrepresentative jury venires.244
In rejecting Pritt’s challenge to underrepresentation in the Mid-
dle District of Florida’s Orlando Division, the trial judge treated 
the defendant’s Sixth Amendment complaint as if it were an equal 
protection claim. He emphasized that the defendant
has not alleged that the Clerk’s processes or the use of the 
voter registration lists are anything but neutral [or] . . . that 
the [selection] process [was] not executed in a neutral and 
random manner. [Defendant] only objects that the neutral 
process results in the underrepresentation of Blacks and 
Hispanics. This does not amount to systematic exclusion 
under the Sixth Amendment.”245
While neutrality may be a defense to a charge of intentional dis-
crimination, it is not dispositive when a defendant argues that a ju-
ry plan, despite the best of intentions, still fails to recruit jurors 
from a cross-section of the community. Otherwise, there is no way 
to make sense of Congress’s decision to approve of voter registra-
tion lists as a nondiscriminatory starting point but also to require 
courts to supplement the voter registration list with other sources 
of juror names, should that be necessary, to achieve a cross-
sectional source list.246
Until courts cease wielding the systematic exclusion prong of the 
Duren test as an all-purpose excuse for unrepresentative jury pools, 
the problems identified in this Article will remain beyond legal re-
dress. When the evidence shows, as it did in our four jury challeng-
es, that a jury plan continuously underrepresents minorities in jury 
wheel after jury wheel, that very continuity constitutes a systematic 
failure that the government should be obliged to remedy. As the 
California Supreme Court has long recognized, at some point the 
state’s “negligence or inertia” in the face of continued failure to 
243. United States v. Orange, 447 F.3d 792, 800 (10th Cir. 2006) (“Discrepancies result-
ing from the private choices of potential jurors do not represent the kind of constitutional 
infirmity contemplated by Duren.”).
244. Hannaford-Agor, supra note 16, at 764 (“By perpetuating the misconception that 
courts have no responsibility to address causes of underrepresentation other than those in-
herent in the system itself, caselaw has created a functional safe harbor in which courts can 
ignore substantial minority underrepresentation in their own jury pools as long as they can 
plausibly deny actively contributing to the problem.”).
245. United States v. Pritt, No. 6:09-cr-110-Orl-28KRS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63470, at 
*15–16 (M.D. Fla. June 8, 2010).
246. 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2) (2012).
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achieve representative jury wheels “may drift into discrimination by 
not taking affirmative action to prevent it.”247
Moreover, there is something odd about fobbing off the failures 
to register to vote, to keep addresses up-to-date, or to respond to 
jury summons as private choices when structural forces, such as 
poverty, housing disparities, and racial and ethnic status, should 
raise concerns about the voluntariness of these choices.248
If courts could adopt a more relaxed or flexible understanding 
of that which constitutes a systematically defective jury plan under 
Duren, then a number of reforms come to the fore for addressing
problems of undeliverable mail and non-response:
(i) Update addresses. At a minimum, courts should update the ad-
dresses on the MJW annually, using the National Change of Ad-
dress (NCOA) list maintained by the United States Postal Service. 
Biannual review, adopted in Massachusetts federal courts,249 would 
be even better, given the frequency with which people move.250 The 
jury clerk for the Northern District of Illinois currently puts the 
MJW addresses through the NCOA system every ninety days.251
(ii) Follow-up mailings. State courts have significantly reduced 
failures to appear by sending a second mailing to every person who 
did not respond to their first summons. In Los Angeles County, for 
instance, the initial non-response rate of 52% fell to 36% simply by 
sending a second mailing.252 A pilot program in Eau Claire, Wis-
consin also dramatically reduced non-response with second and 
third mailings.253 A study by the National Center for State Courts 
compared state jurisdictions that send follow-up mailings to those 
that do not and concluded that, in courts that follow-up, non-
response and failure to appear rates were 24% to 46% less than 
those reported by courts that did not send follow-up mailings.254
(iii) More rigorous enforcement? As a way of curing non-response, 
some commentators suggest that jury duty should be rigorously en-
247. People v. Superior Court, 113 Cal. Rptr. 732, 736 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974).
248. See, e. g., Sandra F. Sperino, Rethinking Discrimination Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 69, 92–
93 (2011) (“It is likely that structural problems and unconscious bias contribute to the dis-
criminatory environment.”).
249. See, e.g., DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS PLAN, supra note 41, at § 6(c) (“The Clerk 
shall submit the names on the Master Jury Wheel and the Supplemental Jury Wheel twice a 
year to be updated through the national change-of-address system of the United States Post-
al Service and corrected as appropriate before issuing summonses.”).
250. The Census Bureau estimates that an average of 15% of households move each 
year. See Caprathe et al., supra note 186, at 18.
251. Telephone Interview with Thomas Bruton, Clerk of Court, Northern Dist. of Ill. 
(Mar. 29, 2018).
252. Hannaford-Agor, supra note 16, at 775.
253. Id.
254. Id.
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forced as the draft it is meant to be.255 For instance, a Los Angeles 
County court study proposed new legislation to “plac[e] a hold 
upon driver’s license renewals of those persons who fail to respond 
to a juror summons.”256 Massachusetts runs a delinquent juror pro-
gram that authorizes fines up to $2,000 for failures to appear for 
jury duty.257
The JSSA does give courts discretion to enforce juror summons-
es by fine, jail, or community service.258 However, the above exam-
ples notwithstanding, enforcement is episodic at best.259 Enforcing 
jury duty as a true draft might make sense as a matter of law and 
logic. However, it defies common sense to believe that unwilling 
participants make good jurors. As one federal court put it, “anyone 
with experience as a trial judge knows that a person forced against 
his will to serve on a jury is apt to be an angry juror and that an an-
gry juror is a bad juror.”260 In line with this remark, jurors motivat-
ed only by the threat of punishment would lead to new reasons for 
granting challenges for cause or for exercising peremptory chal-
lenges. Culturally speaking, in an era where even military duty is 
voluntary, there is a limit to how rigorously the state should con-
script people into jury service. There is much to recommend the 
current compromise, where there is no opt-in (volunteering) for 
jury duty but there is an unacknowledged opt-out.
(iv) Weighted summonsing. Two of the four jurisdictions where we 
brought our challenges put in place a better remedy for non-
response. The District of Massachusetts and the Northern District 
of Illinois now engage in a system of targeted or weighted sum-
monsing to compensate for disproportionately low yields of minor-
ity jurors.261 The District of Kansas has since followed suit.262
255. Id. at 784–85 (“Individuals who believed nothing would happen were significantly 
less likely to appear for service than those who believed they would be punished for their 
failure to appear.”).
256. Kelso, supra note 52, at 1454 (Recommendation 3.5); see also U.S. v. Murphy, No. 94 
CR 794, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8488, at *3–4 (indicating that the percentage of African
Americans on the Master and Qualified Jury Wheels increased when second and third mail-
ings gave addressee the choice between finally returning a completed questionnaire or ap-
pearing at the courthouse on a specific date to explain their failure).
257. Hannaford-Agor, supra note 16, at 784–85; JURY TRIAL INNOVATIONS 47–48 (G. 
Thomas Munsterman et al. eds., 2d ed. 2006). In Wisconsin, county courts have discretion to
impose fines on delinquent jurors. See For Jurors, WIS. COURT SYS.,
https://www.wicourts.gov/services/juror/terms.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2018).
258. 28 U.S.C. § 1866(g) (2012).
259. See Hannaford-Agor, supra note 16, at 784 (conceding the reality of nonenforce-
ment).
260. United States v. Gometz, 730 F.2d 475, 480 (7th Cir. 1984).
261. See discussion supra Parts III, V.
262. See D. KAN. R. PRACTICE AND P. 38.1 (2016), http://www.ksd.uscourts.gov/wp-
content/uploads/local_rules/local_rules.pdf.
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In Massachusetts, Judge Nancy Gertner—alone among trial 
judges in our four jurisdictions—found that the Division’s system 
for summoning jurors violated the cross-sectional requirements of 
the JSSA.263 Consequently, Judge Gertner ordered two remedies. As 
noted earlier in this Article, for every jury questionnaire returned 
as undeliverable, Judge Gertner ordered that a replacement ques-
tionnaire be sent randomly to an address from the same zip code as 
the first questionnaire.264 Aware that she could not constitutionally 
order a race-conscious remedy, Judge Gertner chose a geograph-
ical remedy, knowing that hyper-segregation in certain zip codes 
would increase the probability that one minority juror lost through 
an undeliverable questionnaire would be replaced with another 
minority juror. Judge Gertner ordered the same zip code remedy 
for every instance of non-response to a questionnaire presumably 
delivered.265
The First Circuit vacated Judge Gertner’s order, however, noting 
that a single judge in a multi-judge district lacks authority to 
change the existing jury plan on her own.266
Subsequently, in 2005, Massachusetts federal judges voluntarily 
decided to amend their jury plan to deal with the problems that 
Judge Gertner found.267 The District adopted Judge Gertner’s rem-
edy for zip-code-targeted second mailings for every questionnaire 
returned as undeliverable.268 However, it did not require the same 
remedy for non-responses. To date, no one has studied the impact 
of this remedy on the incidence of undeliverable questionnaires.
In 2013, the Northern District of Illinois voluntarily adopted its 
own zip-code-weighted mailing plan, both for undeliverable sum-
monses and for non-responses.269 As reported in Part V, the North-
ern District also began supplementing the voter registration list 
with the lists of licensed drivers and state-issued identification card
holders in 2013.270 In 2017, the District added the names and ad-
dresses of people applying for or receiving unemployment com-
pensation within the last two years.271
263. See discussion supra Part III.
264. United States v. Green, 389 F. Supp. 2d 29, 75–77 (D. Mass. 2005).
265. Id.
266. In re United States, 426 F.3d 1, 7–8 (1st Cir. 2005).
267. See DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS Plan, supra note 41.
268. “For each summons returned by the United States Postal Service to the Court as 
‘undeliverable,’ the Clerk shall draw at random from the Supplemental Jury Wheel the 
name of a resident who lives in the same zip code area to which the undeliverable summons 
had been sent and prepare and cause to be mailed to such resident a new one . . . .” Id. at 
§ 8(a).
269. NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS PLAN, supra note 41, at § 7(b).
270. Id. at § 5(a).
271. Id.
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Massachusetts’ and Illinois’ use of weighted replacement sum-
monsing has the potential merit of achieving in practice that which 
purely random summonsing promises: selection from a cross-
section of the eligible community. Of course, the utility of targeted 
summonsing depends on members of racial or ethnic minorities 
being sufficiently concentrated in particular zip codes so as to 
make geographical location a proxy for racial identity. This is true 
in many areas of Boston and Chicago, but the remedy may not 
work as well in racially diverse neighborhoods.
In other areas of law, courts have upheld the constitutionality of 
public university affirmative action programs that classify persons 
according to geography rather than race.272 There ought to be no 
constitutional objections to the Massachusetts and Illinois plans.273
A closer call is whether the plain language of the JSSA requiring 
random selection proportional to every county rules out replace-
ment mailings weighted by zip code.274 The Eastern Division of 
Massachusetts contains nine counties.275 Part III explained that un-
deliverable questionnaires are disproportionately returned from
the two most urban counties and from a set of zip codes within 
those counties with the highest percentages of minority residents. 
Thus, the replacement mailings will not be proportional by county, 
but will target the two counties with the most undeliverable sum-
monses.
The argument in favor of this plan is that it simply adopts a 
remedy to correct undelivered summonses due to wrong addresses.
On the other side, any summonsing by zip code might be a viola-
tion of the JSSA requirement that all summonsing be proportional 
to the population of each county in the district.276
As of this writing, no challenge based on the JSSA has been 
brought against the Massachusetts and Illinois plans. Insofar as 
272. The University of Texas at Austin currently accepts the top 6% of students from any 
Texas high school. Since high schools in many areas of the state are de facto segregated, the 
expectation is that this way of running an affirmative action program will indirectly accom-
plish that which direct considerations of race would. See Admission Decisions, UNIV. OF TEX. AT 
AUSTIN, https://admissions.utexas.edu/apply/decisions (last visited Nov. 11, 2018)
273. See, e.g., United States v. Bates, No. 05-81027, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117073, at *66 
(E.D. Mich. Dec. 15, 2009) (opining that the geographical basis of the Massachusetts plan 
passes muster under the Equal Protection Clause).
274. 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(3) (2012) requires that “each county, parish, or similar politi-
cal subdivision within the district or division [be] substantially proportionally represented in 
the master jury wheel . . . .”
275. See United States v. Green, 389 F. Supp. 2d 29, 41 n.15 (D. Mass. 2005).
276. The United States attorney made this argument on appeal of Judge Gertner’s order 
of zip-code targeted summonsing in Green, 389 F. Supp. 2d 29. However, the First Circuit did 
not reach this contention, noting only that “[w]ithout developing its argument in detail, the 
government has questioned whether the district court’s remedy would comport with the 
statute even if embodied in a properly adopted plan.” In re United States, 426 F. 3d 1, 9 (1st 
Cir. 2005).
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these reforms were adopted to comply with the Sixth Amendment 
mandate of cross-sectional jury selection,277 the traditional rule of 
statutory construction is to construe the statute so as to avoid if 
possible any conflict between statute and constitution.
If courts adopted all or some of the reforms recommended in 
this Part, they would be in a better position to offer remedies for 
the maladies that this Article diagnosed as bleeding representation 
from our jury pools.
CONCLUSION
Although we lost all four of our jury challenges, federal districts 
in Massachusetts and Illinois subsequently reformed their jury 
plans to address problems with undeliverable mail and non-
response that our data singled out as the greatest causes of minori-
ty underrepresentation in jury pools.278 In the Southern District of 
California, the trial judge also noted these problems and urged his 
fellow District Judges to consider supplementing the voter registra-
tion list with alternate sources of juror names.279 While the District 
has not yet adopted such reforms, the Ninth Circuit, in an en banc 
decision on our jury challenge, abandoned the absolute disparity 
test as a way of measuring underrepresentation.280 In so doing, the 
court acknowledged that math should not mask the extent of fail-
ure to practice the cross-sectional ideal.
In this vein, one final reform suggests itself. In Berghuis v. Smith,
the Supreme Court highlighted for lower courts that traditional 
mathematical tests for measuring jury underrepresentation were 
“imperfect” and that they should feel free to seek better meth-
ods.281
During oral argument in Berghuis, Justice Breyer noted that
mathematical calculations known as binomials could aid courts to 
bring law and math together.282 To use an analogy suggested by 
one commentator, drawing jurors is a bit like drawing cards in 
poker.283 In poker, it is possible to use the binomial theorem to 
277. See JURY TRIAL INNOVATIONS, supra note 257, at 32 (indicating that stratified jury 
selection can help courts avoid Sixth Amendment infractions).
278. See discussion supra Parts III, V.
279. United States v. Garcia-Arellano, Case. No. 08cr-2876 BTM, at *15 (S.D. Cal. June 9, 
2009).
280. United States v. Hernandez-Estrada, 749 F.3d 1154, 1164 (9th Cir. 2014).
281. Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314, 329 (2010).
282. Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314 (2010) (No. 08-
1402) (“[T]he only way you could figure out . . . what’s what here is you use something 
called [the] binomial theorem”).
283. Re, supra note 113, at 535–36.
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compare the odds of drawing 1, 2, 3, or n diamonds from a stand-
ard deck versus making the same draw from a deck stacked by the 
removal of half the diamonds.284 The same binomial calculation 
could be made for jury selection. If a certain minority group is un-
derrepresented on the initial source list, then the chances of draw-
ing 1, 2, 3 or n members of this group on an actual jury are less 
than the odds would be when making the same draw from a fairly 
representative starting point. Although the math may seem diffi-
cult, the numbers are readily calculated by using a freely available 
binomial calculator or online program.285
Consider for instance a commentator’s hypothetical jurisdiction 
where a distinctive group constitutes 25% of the population but 
only 10% of the members of jury venires.286 Practically speaking, 
courts want to know how this affects the chances that random se-
lection will result in one, two, three (and so on) members of that 
group on a given jury. The binomial theorem helps us calculate 
these odds. If the group had been fairly represented, then a de-
fendant would have faced a 16% chance of drawing a jury with one 
or no members of that group. However, due to the underrepresen-
tation of that group in jury pools, the odds of drawing one or no 
jurors of that group swelled to 66%, an increase of 50%.287
Since the binomial calculation is a matter of math rather than 
law, it cannot answer the normative question of where to draw the 
line between acceptable and unacceptable levels of underrepresen-
tation. Still, the calculation provides courts with precise infor-
mation about the odds of drawing a representative jury. In the 
above example, where a group is 25% of the population but only 
10% of jury venires, the prevailing absolute disparity test would 
come up with a loss of 15% representation. But that number stands 
in a vacuum, whereas the binomial calculation addresses that 
which we need to know: the difference in the chances of drawing a 
representative jury.
In 1879, when Arthur Sullivan wrote the lyrics for the Gilbert 
and Sullivan operetta, The Pirates of Penzance, he satirized the bi-
nomial theorem as something known only to pompous blowhards 
such as the play’s Major-General character.288 Although the term 
284. Id.
285. Two freely available programs are RStudio statistical software with the command 
“dbinom” and Excel command “BINOM.DIST.”
286. Re, supra note 113, at 543.
287. Id.
288. “I am the very model of a modern Major-General . . . . I’m very well acquainted, too, 
with matters mathematical. I understand equations, both the simple and quadratical. About 
binomial theorem I’m teeming with a lot o’ news, [w]ith many cheerful facts about the 
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remains as obscure as it was in Gilbert and Sullivan’s time, judges 
do not have to sing their own praises to do the math. They only 
must be “the very models” of a modern judge when it comes to us-
ing math to inform the law.
square of the hypotenuse.” W.S. Gilbert & Arthur Sullivan, The Pirates of Penzance,
https://www.naic.edu/~gibson/poems/gilbert1.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2018).
